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The paper examines the incentives and distortions 
created by tax policy and administration structures 
that motivate individuals to undeclare or under-declare 
work in the new EU member countries. It analyses the 
tax level and the tax structure “mix” of tax instruments, 
the special taxation regimes set up to attract workers 
and entrepreneurs back into the formal economy and 
how tax policies such as the introduction of a “flat tax” 
on income from labor and capital impacted workers 
and entrepreneurs in terms of formalizing work. It also 
attempts to gain some insight into the effectiveness of 
tax administration by comparing some input and output 
measures As non-tax factors can amplify the adverse 
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effects of taxes on the labor market and reduce the 
effectiveness of tax reform, some of these other economic 
framework conditions are also discussed. This paper 
concludes by refining the main results and possible best 
practices for tackling undeclared work. The paper argues 
that the new EU member countries have had mixed 
success tackling undeclared work. While taxation matters, 
other underlying conditions for formal sector activity are 
also important. Addressing the problem of undeclared 
work therefore requires a broad policy approach with 
further improvements in tax policies, tax administration, 
and in general economic framework conditions for 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.  Undeclared work is commonly defined as employment, which according to the law 
should be declared but  is kept fully or partially outside the scope of taxation and social 
insurance (European Commission, 1998). There are several reasons why people work in the 
informal sector or – when working in the formal sector - declare only part of their income. In 
an environment where formal sector jobs are scarce, the informal sector is often the only 
place individuals can find work, and thus survive. Work opportunities in the formal sector 
may  be  lacking  because  of  weak  labor  demand  due  to  low  economic  growth  or  over-
burdensome regulations, including high taxes, red tape, and strict labor market regulations. 
Further, some individuals may choose an informal sector job because the net income is higher 
– employees don‘t have to factor in taxes and social benefits in their wages so they can keep 
more of it. This may result in a decline of labor supply to the formal sector. Indeed, high 
taxes and other regulations for formal sector activity are often the main reasons why firms 
and individuals shift activities to the informal sector or declare only part of their income. 
Some people also feel that the poor quality of government services is a valid reason to work 
in the informal sector, since they believe that money given to the government is wasted. 
Under such conditions, tax enforcement is difficult. Furthermore, tax administration may not 
be adequately equipped with skilled and dedicated staff nor with adequate technical facilities, 
and the will to enforce the law may be weak due to corruption or a lack of autonomy.     
 
2.  The  societal  approach  to  tax  compliance  may  also  differ  between  countries. 
Informality and tax evasion are more widespread  when tax systems are complex; paying 
taxes  entails  high  administrative  costs  for  firms  and  individuals  and  the  burden  of  tax 
enforcement is too high. From this perspective, widespread and sustained informal work can 
be seen as  a warning signal that something is wrong within the framework under which 
formal  sector  activity  operates.  The  root  causes  may  include  excessive  taxes  and  other 
regulations in labor and product markets, as well as inefficient bureaucracy.  
 
3.  In  addition  to  these  structural  problems,  undeclared  work  also  has  a  cyclical 
component. When the economy is booming labor demand in the formal sector increases and 
workers are in a better position to fight employers seeking to underdeclare their wage, which 
reduces their unemployment and pension benefits. However, at the time of writing this report, 
the global economic crisis of 2009 has pushed most Central and Eastern European countries 
into severe recessions and unemployment has increased. It is very likely that this will lead to 
an increase in undeclared work in countries that have achieved some progress combatting 
informality  in  the  past.  Additionally,  when  taxes  are  raised  to  reduce  fiscal  deficits  the 
problem of undeclared work could be exacerbated.  
 
4.  Undeclared work raises both equity and efficiency problems. Inequity arises as those 
who dutifully abide by the law have lower net incomes than dishonest evaders who receive 
the same gross income.  There is also unfair competition between honest firms and firms that 
underdeclare wages; the latter may also benefit from public procurement if open tendering 
focuses only on prices. A high incidence of non-declaration of work also creates a vicious 
cycle  of  lower  government  revenues,  poor  public  services,  a  higher  tax  burden  on  fully 
declared  work,  and  unfair  competition  between  firms  and  individuals,  thus  reinforcing 
incentives for shifting activities to the informal sector. If evasion rises above a critical level it 
may also become a herd phenomenon leading to less moral qualms (as ―everybody does it‖ - 
Hanousek and Palda, 2008). Furthermore, large informal sectors tend to restrain productivity   2 
and growth of the economy, as informal firms are generally less productive than formal firms 
because they prefer to remain small and ―invisible‖ and because informal workers tend to 
receive  less  training  than  formal  workers.  The  incidence  of  informal  activities  should 
therefore be considered when making economic analysis and designing policies. 
 
5.   This  paper  examines  the  incentives  and  distortions  created  by  tax  policy  and 
administration structures that motivate individuals to un- (or under-) declare work in the new 
EU member countries and Croatia (to be referred to as NM-EU even if Croatia is not yet a 
member). As a multi-country, regional paper, certain countries  among this group will be 
selected as archetypes for in-depth analysis and distilling of lessons learned. While cross-
country benchmarking of taxation and tax policy indicators is critical, not all countries will be 
covered comprehensively or uniformly in this analysis. This paper seeks to provide answers 
to the following questions: 
 
  To what extent is the level and ―mix‖ of tax instruments deployed by governments - 
and the relative reliance of certain instruments over others, such as taxes on earnings 
versus other taxes – responsible for the size of undeclared work? 
 
  Are most of these countries making the same ―mistakes‖ with respect to tax policy 
and administration and the disincentives to formalize? 
 
  What has been the experience with special taxation regimes set up to attract workers 
and entrepreneurs back into the formal economy? What are the failures, successes, 
and lessons for policymakers?   
 
  How has the introduction of a ―flat tax‖ on income from labor and capital impacted 
workers and entrepreneurs in terms of formalizing work?  
 
  Are there successful experiences (inside or outside the region) with shifting away 
from an ―over reliance‖ on labor taxes to a more efficient tax mix?  Has such a shift 
led to an increase of the formal economies? 
 
6.  The following sections first look at the extent of undeclared work in the NM-EU 
countries  (Section  2)  and  how  –  according  to  opinion  polls  –  people  in  these  countries 
perceive the role of taxation in undeclared work (Section 3). This is followed by a description 
of the various channels through which taxes may affect undeclared work (Section 4) and by 
cross-country comparisons of these potential sources for undeclared work, namely the overall 
tax burden (Section 5), the tax mix (Section 6), labor tax wedges (Section 7), and the design 
of taxation within the broad tax categories, which may encourage or discourage undeclared 
work (Sections 8 - 11). This is followed by an attempt to gain insight into the effectiveness of 
tax administration by comparing some input and output measures (Section 12). As non-tax 
factors  can  amplify  the  adverse  effects  of  taxes  on  the  labor  market  and  reduce  the 
effectiveness of tax reform, some of these other economic framework conditions are briefly 
discussed (Section 13). This paper concludes by refining the main results and possible best 
practices for tackling undeclared work (Section 14).  
 
7.  This paper argues that NM-EU countries have had mixed success tackling undeclared 
work. While taxation matters, other underlying conditions for formal sector activity are also 
important.  Addressing  the  problem  of  undeclared  work  therefore  requires  a  broad  policy   3 
approach  with  further  improvements  in  tax  policies,  tax  administration,  and  in  general 
economic framework conditions for formal sector activity.   
 
2. Undeclared Economic Activity: Widespread with Differences 
across Countries 
 
8.  Problems  with  informality  are  apparent  in  many  countries  although  to  different 
degrees.  While it is notoriously difficult to gauge the size of the problem of undeclared work, 
estimates  indicate  that  most  NM-EU  countries  have  relatively  large  informal  sectors  – 
reducing undeclared work is therefore a main policy objective. The relatively high share of 
undeclared work in these countries is, to some extent, a legacy of its history.  In central and 
eastern European countries, the ―black‖ or ―grey‖ economy increased rapidly during the first 
period of transition in the early 1990s when the new regulatory framework and the new 
bureaucracy were in a fledgling stage.  Many workers in the formal sector lost their jobs and 
unemployment increased sharply. Working informally ―to help friends‖ and gain additional 
income was also common in the communist system.  Furthermore, with the breakdown of the 
old system and the transition to a market economy, the provision of public services was poor, 
tax administration was nascent, and many perceived the new system as being driven by ―the 
law of the jungle‖.  All this contributed to lower tax morale.  In the meantime, the transition 
of the economy to one with more multinational firms and a more effective bureaucracy has 
made progress almost everywhere, although to different degrees.  However, as labor demand 
has declined during the recent economic crisis, workers may again be pushed into informal 
activities. 
 
9.  Various approaches have been applied to measure the size of the informal economy 
and tax evasion  and they  are not  all conclusive. According to  an aggregate econometric 
approach (Schneider - 2009)
2  the informal economy in these countries averages around 30 
percent of GDP, which is twice as high as the 21 OECD countries in the comparison group.
3 
But there are large differences between NM-EU countries; the Slovak and Czech Republics 
have informal economies on the lower end (between 17 and 18 percent of GDP) and Estonia, 
Croatia, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria have larger informal economies (between 35 and 40 
percent of GDP). Between 1999/2000 and 2006/2007 the size of the informal economies has, 
according  to  these  estimates,  declined  somewhat  in  most  of  these  countries  with  the 







                                                 
2 This econometric approach uses direct and indirect tax burdens together with other variables such as burden of 
state regulation and GDP per capita, currency demand, and employment to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy; the higher the tax burden, the regulatory burden, unemployment and the cash economy and the lower 
GDP per capita and the official employment rate, the higher is – according to this approach - the size of the 
informal economy. For the purpose of our paper, which examines the impact of taxation on undeclared work, 
this approach of quantifying the shadow economy has, however, a drawback as it is to some extent tautological.    
3 The comparison group of 21 OECD countries includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.   4 
Table 1: The size of the Shadow economy in the New EU Member countries and Croatia  
(Shadow economy as a percentage of official GDP) 
 
Countries  1999/00  2006/07 
1. Slovakia   18.9  17.4 
2. Czech Republic  19.1  18.2  
3. Hungary  25.1  24.4 
4. Slovenia  27.1  26.4 
5. Poland  27.6  26.5 
6.  Lithuania  30.3  28.2 
7. Estonia  38.4  36.0 
8. Croatia   33.4  36.5 
9. Latvia   39.9  37.1 
10. Romania  34.4  37.4 
11. Bulgaria  36.9  39.4 
Unweighted average  30.1  29.8 
Unweighted average 
of 21 OECD 
countries 
16.8  14.8 
(2004/2005) 




10.  In an international business survey for the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
2009, people were asked about the importance of tax evasion for hampering business activity. 
Among NM-EU countries, the level of tax evasion was seen as least problematic in the Czech 
Republic (ranked 11
th among 57 countries), followed by the Slovak Republic (ranked 17
th), 
while in Hungary (ranked 53
rd), Romania (ranked 55
th) and Croatia (ranked 56
th) tax evasion 
was seen as most problematic (Table 2). It is unclear, however, if the survey participants in 
the various countries used the same unit of measurement when assessing tax evasion. For 
example, it is possible that in one country people are more sensitive to the problem of tax 
evasion than in another country, even if the actual level of tax evasion is lower. Some caution 
is therefore needed when comparing the country ranking within the NM-EU countries and 
also in comparison with other countries.  
 
11.  The  EU  Commission  in  the  European  Employment  Observatory  has  published 
estimates of informal sectors, which are based on National Accounts statistics (EC 2007). 
These estimates confirm that informal sectors are relatively large in most of the new EU 
countries.  According  to  these  estimates,  informal  sectors  are  smaller  than  estimated  by 
Schneider and the ranking across the NM-EU countries is also different. These estimates 
reveal that Estonia has the smallest informal sector among the new EU member countries and 
it  is  also  lower  than  in  some  old  EU  member  countries,  including  Sweden.  Estonia  is 
followed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, and 
Bulgaria (Table 3). 
  
12.  Applying a regression model, Albu (2007) estimated for Romania the average share 
of informal income in total household income at between 17 and 18 percent in 2005, down 
from around 22 to 23 percent in 2000, which is also lower than the estimate by Schneider and 
close to the estimate of the EU study. It has also been estimated that in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland around one tenth of the workforce are typically not reported for tax 
purposes and in Slovakia and Lithuania this share is 6 percent (OECD, 2008, EC 2007).   5 
Based  on  survey  data  and  applying  dynamic  analysis  and  a  Markov-chain  approach  for 
predictions, Hanousek and Palda (2008) find that in the Czech Republic between 1995 and 
2006, the percentage of tax evaders first increased, then leveled off and they suggest that it is 
now falling along a quadratic path.  
 
Table 3: Prevalence of undeclared work in the New EU Member States according to the EU 
Commission 
 
1. Estonia  7.3 % of GDP in 2004, a decline by 2.7 percentage points since 
2000.  
2. Czech Republic  9-10% of GDP, no change in recent years 
3. Slovakia  13-15% of GDP estimated in 2000 and moderate decline in recent 
years 
4. Poland  12-15% of GDP after 14 % in 2003 
5. Lithuania  6% of total employment. Slight decrease from 8 % of total 
employment and 15-19% of GDP in 2003  
6. Slovenia  17% of GDP, no change in recent years 
7. Hungary  18% of GDP, no change in recent years 
8. Latvia   18% of GDP, no change in recent years 
9. Romania  16-21% of GDP, no change in recent years 
10. Bulgaria  22-30% of GDP estimated in 2002/2003; survyeys indicate a 
marked increase in recent years 
Undeclared work in selected 
other EU countries 
 
Sweden: 5% of GDP and 11% of workers 
Denmark: 3% of GDP 
Spain: 12.3% of GDP 
Greece: above 20% of GDP  
Sources: EC 2007; Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union (Renoy et al., 2004); Statistics Estonia.  
 
 
3. The Role of Taxes According to Opinion Polls 
 
13.  In a survey, launched by the EU Commission, individuals in EU member countries 
were asked to report on undeclared work, defined as all remunerated activities (in-kind or 
cash), which are in principle legal but are not declared to tax authorities or social security 
institutions (EC 2007a). According to this opinion poll, the most frequent reasons for taking 
part in undeclared work in the new EU member countries are that salaries in the regular 
sector are too low. Taxes and social security contributions are also often mentioned as being 
an  important  motivator  for  working  informally.  In  Hungary  and  Lithuania  about  30-35 
percent  of  respondants  mentioned  taxes  as  the  most  important  reason  for  carrying  out 
undeclared work, whereas taxes was the most important determinant for less than 10 percent 
of the respondants in Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria (Figure 1).  
 
14.  The European Employment Observatory (EC 2007a) confirms the importance of taxes 
for carrying out undeclared work. It finds that that:  
 
  In Hungary, high income taxes together with social security contributions are seen as 
providing strong incentives for undeclared work;  
  In  Lithuania,  the  combination  of  relatively  low  salaries  and  high  taxes  including 
social security contributions are regarded as the main drivers for undeclared work;   6 
  In  the  Czech  Republic,  the  high  taxation  of  labor  (including  social  security 
contribtions) is regarded as a strong incentive for undeclared work; 
  In Estonia, high labor taxes are seen as the main reason for undeclared work. The 
personal income tax has been lowered to encourage regular employment, while at the 
same time the minimum social security contribtion for the self-employed has been 
increased to reduce underdeclaration of income. It is felt, however, that the benefit 
system provides only few incentives to undertake regular work;  
  In Latvia, evading taxes is the main motive for undeclared work. The pension system 
has been reformed by better linking benefits to contributions but it is felt that this is 
insufficient to reduce tax evasion; 
  In  Poland,  labor  taxation,  in  particular  on  low  wage  earners,  provides  a  strong 
incentive  for  undeclared  work.  Informal  workers  often  receive,  besides  their 
undeclared  income,  transfers  from  the  government  (retirement  pension,  disability 
pension, unemployment benefits, and social assistance) and have therefore no strong 
incentive to take up declared work;  
  In  Bulgaria,  taxes  and  social  security  contributions  provide  an  incentive  for 
undeclared work, but according to the employers´organisations, undeclared work is 
mainly  used  by  small  and  micro-businesses,  including  the  self-employed  while 
according  to  this  survey  medium  and  large  firms  are  (with  minor  exeptions)  not 
involved in undeclared work; 
  In Slovenia, labor taxes are relatively high. More recently, the personal income tax 
has been reduced and (between 2006 and 2009) the payroll tax has gradually been 
phased out in order to make formal employment more attractive;  
  In 2004 Slovakia implemented a major tax reform with all corporate and personal 
income (and also VAT) being taxed at a flat tax rate of 19 percent and some base-
broadening measures. It is felt that this had a positive impact on declaring income, as 
there are fewer incentives to shift income to a lower tax base; 
  In 2005 Romania introduced a flat income tax regime with a flat tax rate of 16 percent 
for corporate and personal income.  While this appears to have stimulated economic 
growth, there is no evidence so far that it has reduced undeclared work. It is felt that 
given  the  complexity  of  factors  that  lead  to  undeclared  work,  such  tax  reform 
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Figure 1: What are in your opinion the primary reasons for doing undeclared work? (share of 







































































Salaries in the regular businesses are too low
Taxes and/or social security contributions are too high
Lack of control by authorities
Lack of regular jobs on the labour market
 
Source: Undeclared Work in the European Union‖ Eurobarometer survey, October 2007 
 
15.  Relatively low regular salaries together with relatively high taxes on labor, may also 
explain  why  in  the  new  EU  countries  undeclared  work  often  takes  the  form  of  under-
declaration of income by paying part of the wage to registered workers on a cash-in-hand-
basis (so-called envelope wage) or registration as self-employed, both of which result in more 
opportunities to evade taxes. Employers who pay envelope wages not only evade labor taxes 
but will also have to conceal some of their taxable sales in order to receive unregistered cash. 
For  Estonia,  the  Estonian  Institute  of  Economic  Research  (Eesti  Konjunktuurinstiituut) 
estimated that in  2008, 12 percent  of employees  received unreported wages  (of  which 6 
percent received unreported wages on a regular basis and 6 percent only occasionally); the 
share of employees who received part of their wage undeclared declined from 16 percent in 
2003 to 11 percent in 2006 before increasing again in 2007 to 14 percent. The decline to 12 
percent in 2008 may not be sustainable given the recent deterioration of the economy. The 
decision not to report wages to the authorities appears to largely stem from employers, while 
the  employees  have  little  inﬂuence  on  the  decision  (Staehr,  2009).  Some  31  percent  of 
employees who received undeclared wages were satisfied with the situation, while 45 percent 
were not. Among those that were dissatisfied, 55 percent believed that they would lose their 
job  if  they  would  not  accept  this  form  of  payment  (European  Foundation  for  the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006). 
 
16.  In  10,671  face-to-face  interviews  in  eleven  Eastern  European  countries,  Williams 
(2008) found that 10 percent of all employees received envelope wages, but that there are 
large differences across countries. While in the Czech Republic only 3 percent of employees 
had received envelope wages in the previous 12 months, in Slovenia it was 5 percent, in 
Poland and Lithuania this figure was 11 percent, in Latvia 17 percent, and in Romania 23 
percent. In Romania, employees received about 70 percent of their wage in this manner while 
in the other countries the share of the undeclared wage as a percentage of total wage is much 
smaller. Another form of underreporting income is the ―gratitude payment‖ for services of 
some professions, notably medical doctors. In Hungary, Kornai (2000) interviewd medical 
staff and the general public and found that such cash-in-hand payments are deeply engrained 
in the medical system; gratitude payments are most common for obstetrician services, heart   8 
operations, other difficult surgeries, and emergency house visits at night (where about nine 
out of ten people said that it is customary to give gratitude money).     
 
4. Channels through which Taxes Affect Undeclared Work  
 
17.  The economic literature suggests that taxes should be imposed in a way that is least 
distorting for the economy. A high level of taxes and an unfavorable tax mix can reduce 
growth and employment in the formal sector and push people to the informal sector. Among 
economists,  there  are  different  views  about  how  important  taxes  are  for  growth  and 
employment. This is not surprising as this depends not only the level and structure of taxation 
but  on  many  other  -  and  partly  inter-related  -  factors,  such  as  the  stage  of  economic 
development,  institutional  efficiency,  cultural  factors,  and  –  last  but  not  least  -  whether 
people feel that tax revenue is spent in a productive or unproductive way.  
 
18.  In addition to its macroeconomic effects through aggregate growth and employment, 
taxation also affects undeclared work more directly at the micro level:  
 
  High labor taxes can impose a barrier for firms to create jobs in the formal sector 
(labor demand effect) or encourage workers to work informally (labor supply effect). 
As a result, employment is shifted to the informal sector; 
  With high labor taxes, firms and workers in the formal sector may collude to evade 
taxes in order to cope with intense market competition (survival versus compliance). 
These firms declare only part of the salaries and pay the other (undeclared) part in 
cash (envelope wage), thus reducing the effective tax on labor. In this case, formal 
sector employment does not decline but government revenues are lower; 
  With high taxes on labor income and low taxes on capital income, individuals may 
transform labor income into capital income in order to reduce their tax burden; 
  The tax treatment of families (individual taxation or joint taxation, granting of family 
allowances, etc.) may encourage secondary earners to work informally if additional 
formal income would face a high marginal tax rate; 
  Where  the  effective  tax  burden  is  lower  for  self-employed  than  for  dependent 
employees (due to lower tax rates, a lower tax base or more room to underdeclare 
income),  workers  may  shift  (voluntarily  or  being  pushed  by  employers)  from 
dependent employment to self-employment;  
  Special provisions, such as in-work benefits (employment tax credits) can reduce the 
effective  labor  tax  wedge  and  encourage  formal  employment.  However,  as  these 
benefits are generally withdrawn at higher incomes, they raise the marginal effective 
tax  rate,  which  creates  disincentives  to  increase  work  efforts  and  encourages 
underdeclaration of wages in order to receive full benefits.  
 
19.  The impact of taxes on undeclared work also depends on the effectiveness of tax 
administration. An effective tax administration is crucial for reducing undeclared work and 
tax  evasion  in  general.  If  tax  collectors  have  a  reputation  for  being  un-professional  and 
services  for  taxpayers  are  poor,  individuals  are  more  tempted  to  evade  taxes  or  bribe 
government officials. Bribes impose a ―corruption tax‖ on business, which is collected by the 
corrupt individuals at the cost of the general public. The vulnerability to corruption also 
depends on the level of taxes, the complexity of the system, how much discretion is left to tax 
collectors, their salaries and on the internal control system of the tax administration.    9 
 
20.  The impact of taxes on undeclared work also depends on factors that are not directly 
related to  tax policies and tax administration.  If other obstacles to  formal sector activity 
remain in place, reforming the tax system and tax administration aimed at increasing formal 
employment and reducing tax evasion may not be effective. Such obstacles can be income-
dependent  social  benefits,  which  create  high  effective  marginal  tax  rates  and  encourage 
workers to underdeclare wages in order to receive the full benefit. Furthermore, unfavorable 
conditions for doing business, such as high market entry barriers for new firms and high 
administrative costs for existing firms, a strict labor code, and a high minimum wage reduce 
the creation of regular jobs and increase costs of transition from informal to formal activity.  
 
5. The Overall Tax Level: Are Public Sectors Too Large?  
 
21.  High taxes increase economic distortions and increase incentives to evade taxes by 
under-declaring parts or all of economic transactions. Economic distortions and tax evasion 
are aggravated if a relatively high tax burden is combined with relatively low income per 
capita, poor provision of public services, inefficient tax administration, high unemployment, 
and low social protection. Such unfavorable conditions prevailed in NM-EU countries during 
the initial years following transition and it is therefore not surprising that informal activities 
flourished.  In  the  meantime,  countries  have  adjusted  their  public  sectors  to  the  new 
conditions, although this process is by no means complete. Some of the NM-EU countries 
still have relatively large levels of public expenditure, which require a relatively high tax 
burden. In these countries, lowering the overall tax burden could help reduce undeclared 
work but this would also require cutting spending, which is politically difficult. But if the 
quality of government spending were improved at the same as the spending cuts were made, 
the provision of public services might not necessarily suffer.  
 
22.  The relationship between the size of government (as reflected in total tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP) and the size of the informal sector is, however, not clear-cut. Thus, other 
policy goals must be considered when assessing the size of government. Different tax (and 
spending) levels may reflect different preferences for public goods and services, and social 
protection through transfer systems and more efficient tax administration. Therefore, many 
advanced countries, notably those in Europe, have relatively large public sectors while their 
informal economies are smaller than in less advanced countries with smaller public sectors. 
 
23.  High  tax  levels  that  have  an  adverse  effect  on  growth  and  (formal)  employment, 
likely  encourage  undeclared  work,  therefore  reducing  taxes  would  reduce  tax  evasion. 
However, there is no consensus among economists about the effect of the overall tax level on 
economic performance. A number of studies found a negative effect of higher tax levels on 
growth and employment (e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1996; Leibfritz et al. 1997; Daveri and 
Tabellini, 2000) while other studies fail to find a strong link between taxes and economic 
performance (e.g. Agell et al. 1997). For a critical review of the literature see Myles (2009). 
 
24.  Based  on  comparisons  with  high  income  countries  and  considering  the  lower  per 
capita  incomes  and  less  experienced  tax  administrations,  Mitra  and  Stern  (2002)  have 
suggested that transition countries should aim at tax revenue-to-GDP ratios in the range of 22 
to  31  percent  or  so,  depending  on  their  stage  of  development.  According  to  this 
benchmarking, only Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania have ―appropriate‖ tax levels while 
the tax burdens in all other NM-EU countries are ―too high‖. Estonia and Latvia straddle the   10 
divider between ―appropriate‖ and ―too high‖. However, there is no clear approach for such 
benchmarking.  For  example,  if  we  take  as  as  a  benchmark  the  regression  line  of  the 
international comparison of tax-GDP ratios relative to GDP per capita (in purchasing power 
parities) as presented in Figure 2, the range of ―appropriate‖ or ―desirable‖ tax levels for the 
NM-EU  countries  is  between  30  and  35  percent,  i.e.  4-8  percentage  points  higher  than 
suggested by Mitra and Stern. According to this benchmarking, among the NM-EU countries 
Estonia is  a ―low-tax country‖ as  its  tax level is  significantly  below the regression line. 
Lithuania,  Latvia,
4  Slovakia,  Poland,  Cz ech  Republic,  and  Romania  are  ―medium-tax 
countries‖ as their tax levels are relatively close (+/- 2 ½ percentage points) to the regression 
line. By contrast, Hungary and Slovenia can be labelled as ―high-tax countries‖ as their tax 
levels are significantly above the regression line.  
 
25.  The  fact  that  some  of  the  NM-EU  countries  collect  relatively  high  tax  revenues 
despite widespread undeclared work suggests that the formal sector in these countries has to 
carry a particularly large tax burden, which makes working informally or semi-informally 
even more attractive. Tax incidence is, however, more evenly spread than taxpayers if the 
formal  sector  succeeds  in  shifting  part  of  the  tax  burden  to  the  informal  sector  through 
increasing output prices, (which are purchased by informal firms or consumers who work 
informally), and/or lowering prices of inputs from informal firms. 
 
26.  The analysis of overall tax levels is, however, only a very crude proxy for the possible 
effects of taxes on economic performance and informal activities as tax distortions emerge at 
the micro level. In the following sections we therefore examine the structure of taxation, 






















                                                 
4 However, in the summer of 2009, the Latvian government has, backed by the IMF, implemented an 
austerity package, which includes the introduction of a progressive income tax system, a new real 
estate property tax, and beginning in 2011, a rise in VAT and social security contributions. 
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Figure 2: The relationship between the ratio of tax to GDP and per capita incomes:  
an international comparison 
Data for 2006 or 2007 (1) 
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(1) 2004 for Argentina and Serbia and Montenegro. 
(2) Calculated using current purchasing power parities. 
 
Source: OECD (2008), National Accounts of OECD Countries - online database, February, IMF (2008), 
Government Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund, December; World Bank (2009), World 
Development Indicators - online database, February; World Bank (2008), and FYR Macedonia - Public 
Expenditure Review, Report No. 42155-MK, February; Indian Ministry of Finance (2008), Indian Public 
Finance Statistics 2007-2008; CEIC database for China. 
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6. Is the Tax Mix Appropriate?  
 
27.  Individual taxes differ with respect to their economic and distributional effects and 
the associated administrative costs. This causes various tradeoffs between different policy 
goals, which have to be considered when designing the tax system. The NM-EU countries 
rely to a large extent on indirect taxes and labor taxes while capital is relatively lightly taxed. 
This tax mix aims at fostering economic growth by shifting the tax mix away from capital 
income to less distorting taxes, notably consumption. The high labor tax is mainly caused by 
the extensive social security systems, where most of the benefits are financed by income-
dependent contributions from labor. At the same time, corporations are lightly taxed so as to 
attract business investment, particularly FDI, in order to accelerate economic growth. The 
bias towards consumption and labor taxes in the NM-EU countries is also illustrated by the 
implicit  tax  rates,  which  are  calculated  by  relating  tax  revenues  to  their  corresponding 
macroeconomic tax bases (Tables 4-6). In Hungary and Slovenia, which have been classified 
above as relatively ―high tax‖, the implicit tax rates are high on both consumption and labor. 
In  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Bulgaria,  and  Romania,  which  have  been  classified  as 
―medium-tax countries‖ implicit tax rates differ significantly with the labor tax burden being 
highest in the Czech Republic and lowest in Romania. Among the countries classified as 
―low tax‖, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, the three Baltic States have a 
particularly low tax burden on capital while in the Slovak Republic the tax burden is more 
balanced.  
 
28.  According to Mitra and Stern (2003), the tax mix in NM-EU countries is much too 
biased towards indirect taxes and social security contributions while the share of income 
taxes is too low. They suggested that transition countries should aim at the following shares 
in total tax revenue: indirect taxes between 32 and 36 percent, income taxes between 27 and 
29 percent, and social security contributions between 27 and 32 percent. Among the NM-EU 
countries,  only  Latvia  and  Lithuania  have  a  tax  mix  which  is  close  to  this  benchmark 
although  their  share  of  indirect  taxes  is  somewhat  higher  than  suggested.  In  all  other 
countries the shares of indirect taxes and of social security contributions are ―too high‖ and 
the share of income tax is ―too low‖ compared to these suggested shares.   
 
29.  The problem of high labor taxes is also demonstrated by empirical work on the effects 
of taxes on the labor market. The general conclusion is that although labor markets tend to be 
more flexible in Central and Eastern Europe than in the EU-15, high labor taxes tend to 
reduce employment (Vork et al., 2007; Ederveen and Thissen, 2004; Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2005; Lenain and Rawdanowicz, 2004; Cazes, 2002). This can be taken as (indirect) evidence 
that high labor taxes also encourage informal work in these countries. While some features of 
the tax mix help to reduce the informal sector, others run counter to this objective. However, 
when changing the tax mix various tradeoffs have to be considered.  These tradeoffs are 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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Table 4: Implicit tax rate on consumption (in %
*) 
  1995 - 1999  2000 - 2004  2005 – 2007  
(ranking in brackets) 
Hungary  28.6  26.4  26.4 (1) 
Bulgaria  -  20.2  25.1 (2) 
Slovenia  24.2  23.7  23.8 (3) 
Estonia  19.6  19.9  23.3 (4) 
Czech Republic  20.2  19.8  21.6 (5) 
Slovak Republic  23.8  20.5  21.0 (6) 
Poland  19.9  17.9  20.4 (7) 
Latvia   19.4  18.1  20.0 (8) 
Romania  15.9 (1999)  16.5  17.9 (9) 
Lithuania  18.9  17.3  17.0 (10) 
EU-25 average  21.3  21.1  22.0 
* The implicit tax rate is calculated by dividing consumption tax revenue by the macroeconomic tax base. 
Source: EU Commission.  
 
Table 5: Implicit tax rate on labor (in %
*) 
  1995 - 1999  2000 - 2004  2005 – 2007 
(ranking in brackets) 
Czech Republic  40.3  41.1  41.4 (1) 
Hungary  42.9  40.2  39.5 (2) 
Slovenia   37.5  37.6  37.3 (3) 
Poland  36.1  32.9  34.1 (4) 
Estonia  38.4  37.2  33.9 (5) 
Lithuania  37.0  38.5  33.6 (6) 
Latvia  36.8  36.9  32.4 (7) 
Bulgaria  35.9 (1999)  35.5  31.7 (8) 
Slovak Republic  38.3  36.1  31.4 (9) 
Romania  37.6 (1999)  30.7  29.5 (10) 
EU-25  35.9  35.4  34.8 
* The implicit tax rate is calculated by dividing labor tax revenue by the macroeconomic tax base. 
Source: EU Commission.  
 
Table 6: Implicit tax rate on capital (in %
*) 
  1995 - 1999  2000 - 2004  2005 – 2007 
(ranking in brackets) 
Czech Republic  22.8  23.9  25.7 (1) 
Slovenia  -  17.3  22.4 (2) 
Poland  21.2  20.7  22.2 (2005-2006) (3) 
Slovak Republic  30.1  21.6  18.4 (4) 
Hungary  -  16.5  16.5 (2005-2006) (5) 
Latvia  18.9  9.8  11.7 (6) 
Lithuania  8.9  6.9  10.9 (7) 
Estonia  10.9  6.6  8.9 (8) 
EU-25 average  24.7  24.2  26.5 
* The implicit tax rate is calculated by dividing capital tax revenue by the macroeconomic tax base. 
Source: EU Commission.  
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6.1 Tax Mix, Economic Performance, and the Informal Economy – some general 
considerations 
Labor versus capital taxation 
 
30.  Labor taxation is generally considered less distorting for the economy than capital 
taxation. The reasons are that labor is less mobile than capital, i.e. can be more easily taxed 
and a (pure) labor tax (like the payroll tax) does not affect capital formation and is therefore 
more neutral with respect to economic growth. The mobility of capital has led to international 
tax competition with the result that many countries including the NM-EU countries have 
reduced corporate income tax rates to relatively low levels. This policy aims at promoting 
economic growth by increasing savings and investment, including FDI. This policy could 
also have a positive side effect on combating informality. With higher growth, labor demand 
in  the  formal  sector  tends  to  increase,  which  reduces  the  pressure  to  work  informally. 
Furthermore, by attracting foreign firms, tax collection may become easier as these firms are 
less likely to underdeclare income than the (often smaller) domestic firms. However, shifting 
too much of the tax burden from capital to labor can be counter-productive. If the loss of 
revenue  from  lowering  capital  taxation has  to  be compensated by higher taxes  on labor, 
capital intensity of production tends to increse and a country with an abundant labor force 
may no longer able to exploit its comparative advantage in the production of labor-intensive 
goods  and services. As  a result, labor demand in  the formal  sector  would  be lower  and 
informal work would remain high. Furthermore, low capital taxation opens a gap between 
labor  and  capital  taxation,  which  encourages  workers  to  evade  labor  taxation  by 
misclassifying  labor  income  as  capital  income.  A  certain  degree  of  capital  taxation  may 
therefore be optimal, notably in countries that are vulnerable to informality (Penallosa and 
Turnovsky, 2004). In a general equilibrium model for Canada, Brou and Collins (2001) find 
that shifting the mix of direct taxes away from labor towards capital reduces the informal 
sector – the informal sector is more labor intensive than the formal sector so with lower labor 
taxation, more of its production is formalized.  
 
31.  The optimal tax mix between labor and capital taxation also depends on enforcement 
capacity (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). If the capacity to detect business income is relatively 
low, it is more likely that high labor taxes lead to underdeclaration of wages, independent of 
the level of profit taxation. With greater capacity to detect business income, firms would have 
no incentive to underdeclare wages if the profit tax would be higher than the labor tax; wage 
costs  are  deductible  expenses,  so  this  would  increase  the  overall  tax  burden  of  firms. 
However,  as  in  the  NM-EU,  the  tax  on  profits  is  much  lower  than  the  tax  on  labor, 
incentivizing firms to underdeclare wages independent of the capacity of the administration 
to detect overall business income.   
 
Labor taxation versus consumption taxation 
 
32.  From an economic perspective one could argue that labor taxation and consumption 
taxation are similar, as both do not tax capital formation, thus promoting economic growth.
5 
Croatia has gone the farthest towards consumption-based taxation as it collects not only 
relatively high shares of tax revenues from indirect taxes and social contributions but has also 
                                                 
5 According to the theory of optimal taxation, both a consumption tax and a pure wage tax (such as social 
security contributions) are efficient as they are inter-temporally neutral; both the consumption tax and the pure 
wage tax do not tax interest income and therefore do not distort saving and investment decisions in contrast to 
income taxation.    15 
transformed its personal income tax system into a consumption-based tax by allowing 
deduction of interest income.  
 
33.  The effects of labor and consumption taxes on formal sector employment depend on 
wage flexibility. In countries where the wage bargaining power of workers is strong enough 
to resist a tax-induced fall in the net real wage by claiming a higher nominal wage, both the 
labor tax and the consumption tax are shifted back to firms, thus  wage costs increase, and as 
a result employment falls (depending on the elasticity of demand). By contrast, if real wages 
are allowed to fall as a result of a higher labor tax or a higher consumption tax, labor demand 
is not affected. However, workers tend to supply less labor to the formal sector (depending on 
the elasticity of supply) and may instead shift their employment to the informal sector in 
order to preserve real earnings. Similarly, buyers of goods and services may respond to a 
higher consumption tax by shifting purchases to the informal sector to prevent a decline of 
their real disposable income.  
 
34.  In the NM-EU countries both labor supply and labor demand effects may play a role 
in  carrying  out  undeclared  work.  As  the  wage  bargaining  power  of  workers  tends  to  be 
relatively weak, part of the labor tax burden may be borne by workers through lower real 
wages. Additionally, workers tend to respond by underdeclaring wages in the regular sector 
and also by working in secondary jobs in the informal sector. This hypothesis is supported by 
the above-mentioned polls, which show that low salaries in the regular sector are seen as an 
important cause for carrying out undeclared work.  At the same time, in some of the NM-EU 
countries,  the  combination  of  a  relatively  high  minimum  wage  and  high  employer 
contributions to social security tends to reduce labor demand for low-skilled workers who 
then try to find a job in the informal sector or work as self-employed where it is easier to 
underdeclare income.  
 
35.  Given the similarities between labor taxation and consumption taxation it has been 
argued that lowering labor taxation and increasing consumption taxation accordingly has no 
major effect on employment, as the real wage remains broadly constant (e.g. Layard et al. 
1996).  However, this neglects the fact that a general consumption tax (such as the VAT) has 
a broader base than a labor tax, as consumption is not only financed by labor income but also 
by capital income, wealth, and government transfers. The effects on prices are also different 
as labor taxation affects producer prices while consumption taxation affects consumer prices. 
Reducing  employer  contributions  to  social  security  and  increasing  VAT  accordingly 
therefore leads to a fall in export prices and an increase in import prices, which increases 
international competitiveness of firms in the same way as a depreciation of the currency. 
There may also be some nominal wage rigidity so that lowering labor taxes and increasing 
consumption taxes may – at least for some time – reduce wage costs for employers. It is 
therefore not surprising that a number of studies have found that shifting the tax burden from 
labor onto consumption increases employment and growth, in particular if transfer recipients 
are not fully compensated for the tax-induced increase in prices (e.g. Daveri and Tabellini, 
2000; EC, 2006).  
 
36.  From  these  latter  studies  one  could  conclude  that  shifting  from  labor  tax  to 
consumption  tax  helps  to  reduce  the  informal  sector.  However,  more  country-specific 
analysis is needed before drawing a strong conclusion on how such a tax shift affects the 
informal economy. While the labor tax reduction makes the use of labor in the formal sector 
less expensive, which tends to increase formal sector output, the increase in the consumption 
tax reduces demand for formal sector output. The net effect on formal sector output (and the   16 
size of the informal sector) is therefore ambiguous and depends on the conditions in the 
countries.
6     
 
Types of labor taxation 
 
37.  There are basically three types of labor tax:  (i) the wage tax, which is part of the 
personal income tax; (ii) the employer and the employee contribution to social security; and 
(iii) some countries also impose a payroll tax, which is similar to the employer contribution 
but  which  is  not  related  to  social  security.  If  labor  taxation  is  shifted  from  employer 
contributions  to  employee  contributions,  it  lowers  labor  costs  of  employers  directly  and 
reduces the net wage of workers. As a result labor demand increases while labor supply 
declines  and  as  the  demand  elasticity  tends  to  be  higher  than  the  supply  elasticity, 
employment in the formal sector tends to increases. But if – over the longer run – workers are 
able to recoup the income loss of higher employee contributions by claiming higher gross 
wages, such tax shifting has no long-run effect on employment amd on informality and it 
does not make a difference in which form labor is taxed (this is the so-called Invariance of 
Incidence Proposition). As the wage bargaining position of workers in the NM-EU countries 
is relatively low, this assumption may, however, not fully hold and such tax shifting from 
employer to employee contributions could lead to permanently lower labor costs and higher 
employment in the formal sector and a lower informal employment. However, the lowering 
of informal employment does not necessarily lead to less tax evasion as evasion in the formal 
sector may increase. The reason is that shifting from employer to employee contributions 
makes workers in the formal sector more aware of the size of social contributions and as their 
net salaries fall, they may respond by underdeclaring income to prevent a fall in net income.  
The response of workers to higher employee contributions also depends on whether these 
contributions  are perceived as  taxes  or as  contributions  to  an insurance system,  i.e. how 
strong the link is between contributions and benefits.  
 
38.  Labor  taxation  can  also  be  shifted  across  income  brackets.  Some  of  the  NM-EU 
countries impose relatively high labor taxes on low-paid workers. At the same time, higher 
wage earners benefit from income ceilings of social security contributions, which makes the 
labor tax regressive.  This is also the case in countries with flat personal income taxes:  the 
basic exemption of the income tax makes the overall labor tax progressive for lower income 
brackets while the income ceilings of social security contributions makes it regressive at 
higher incomes. Eliminating income ceilings of contributions while at the same time reducing 
the rate of contributions reduces the labor tax of low-paid workers and eliminates regressivity 
at higher incomes. As low-paid workers are more vulnerable to informality, this could reduce 
informal  work.  Higher  paid  workers  may,  however,  respond  to  the  higher  labor  tax  by 
evasion. This risk is smaller if at the same time the insurance characteristic of pension and 
health care schemes are strengthened, for example by partial privatization or by strengthening 
the  link  between  contributions  and  benefits  within  public  schemes  (e.g.  by  introducing 
defined-contribution pension schemes) so that contributions are perceived less like a tax and 
more like an insurance premium. Furthermore, raising dividend taxation would reduce the 
incentive to transform labor income into capital income.  
 
                                                 
6 In the above-mentione general equilibrium model for Canada, Brou and Collins (a.a.O.) found – somewhat 
surprisingly - that a change in the tax mix from income taxes to sales taxes increases the share of the informal 
economy as the negative effect of the higher sales tax on formal sector output is larger than the positive effect 
from lower income tax so that the formal sector shrinks.    17 
7. A High Tax Burden on Low Wages Hinders the Transition from 
Informal to Formal Work 
  
39.  This  section  provides  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  labor  tax  wedges  in  NM-EU 
countries. The implicit tax rate on labor as discussed above is a macroeconomic measure of 
the effective tax burden on labor. As it is based on actual tax revenues from all workers it is 
not only affected by the system of labor taxes but also by the degree of tax evasion and the 
earnings distribution. It is therefore too general a measure to examine the disincentives of 
individuals  to  participate  in  the  formal  labor  market  and  –  when  working  formally  –  to 
measure the incentive to underdeclare income. A better measure for such disincentives is the 
labor tax wedge, which is measured for typical workers at different income levels. The labor 
tax wedge is based on statutory tax parameters. It measures the difference between labor 
costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee and includes 
the  personal  income  tax  on  wage  income  and  social  security  contributions.  The  OECD 
Secretariat is regularly calculating average and marginal labor tax wedges for OECD member 
countries and in context of the current project the World Bank has extended this analysis to 
those NM-EU countries, which are not members of the OECD (for more details see Koettl 
…reference).  As  lower  skilled  workers  are  most  vulnerable  to  informality  the  labor  tax 
wedge on lower earnings is of particular importance for the transition costs from informal to 
formal work.  
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40.  The results for the first indicator (ATW) are shown in Table 7 for 2008 for a single 
average wage earner and two lower wage earners.
7 According to these calculations, Hungary 
                                                 
7 The tax wedge is defined as the share of income tax and social security contributions by employers and 
employees over total labor costs. The numbers presented in this table refer to a single earner with no children 
who receives average wage and works 33 or 50 percent part-time or full-time. Alternatively, in most—but not 
all—countries this can be interpreted also as the tax wedge of a single earner with no children, working full-  18 
has not only the highest labor tax wedge among the ten NM-EU countries but also belongs to 
the group of countries with internationally high labor taxes. Lower-skilled workers who are 
particularly vulnerable to informal work also often face high labor tax wedges. For a lower-
skilled worker who earns only half of the average wage, labor tax wedges in the NM-EU 
countries range from around 33 percent in Slovakia to around 43 percent in Hungary. For a 
one-earner couple with two children as shown in Table 8 
8Hungary has again the highest 
labor tax burden among NM-EU countries and – for an average wage earner – among all the 
31 countries, which are included in this table. A lower skilled worker who earns only half of 
the average wage faces in Hungary again a labor tax wedge of around 43 percent compared 
with only 24 and 27 percent in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia. In the paper by Koettl, 
which is part of this project, the distribution of labor tax wedges is also shown for both single 
earners and one earner couples with two children. The labor tax curves are similarly shaped 
for these two types of workers but for one earner couples with two children, the curves tend 
to be shifted to the right so that at a given wage the tax wedge is mostly lower for the married 
worker with two children than for the single worker.  
 
41.  Governments in the NM-EU countries are well aware of the adverse effects of high 
labor taxes on employment and tax evasion and are taking measures to reduce tax wedges. 
Some of them (Hungary included) are providing employment tax credits (in-work benefits) to 
reduce the effective labor tax burden (see below). Others, such as Estonia, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, and Bulgaria have recently reduced labor taxes for all or for lower income 
earners aimed at increasing employment and reducing undeclared work.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
time, but receiving 33, 50, or 100 percent of average wage. In the latter case, working full time at 33 percent of 
average wage might be below the legal minimum wage. 
 
8 The tax wedge is again defined as the share of income tax and social security contributions by employers and 
employees over total labor costs. The numbers presented in this table refer to a one- earner couple with two 
children who receives average wage and works 33 or 50 percent part-time or full-time. Alternatively, in most—
but not all—countries this can be interpreted also as the tax wedge of a one-earner couple with two children, 
working full-time, but receiving 33, 50, or 100 percent of average wage. In the latter case, working full time at 
33 percent of average wage might be below the legal minimum wage. 
   19 
Table 7: Labor tax wedge for single earners with no children by level of average wage 2008  
 
  Level of average wage 
  33%  50%  100% 
Sweden  41.8%  44.6%  47.9% 
Hungary  39.5%  43.4%  54.1% 
Romania  37.9%  39.9%  42.4% 
Bosnia – Federation(1)   37.8%  39.5%  41.8% 
Serbia (1)   36.7%  38.0%  39.3% 
Germany  36.3%  43.0%  51.5% 
Belgium  36.0%  48.5%  55.7% 
Lithuania  36.0%  38.9%  41.6% 
Finland  35.5%  38.0%  44.9% 
Czech Republic  35.2%  36.8%  43.5% 
Bulgaria  35.1%  35.1%  35.1% 
Poland  35.0%  37.4%  39.6% 
Latvia  34.7%  38.2%  41.6% 
Greece  34.4%  34.4%  41.5% 
Estonia  34.0%  36.8%  39.5% 
Austria  33.5%  39.8%  48.5% 
Slovenia  32.9%  35.0%  42.9% 
France  32.5%  35.0%  49.3% 
Netherlands  32.1%  37.5%  45.1% 
Italy   31.5%  36.7%  45.8% 
Slovak Republic  31.4%  33.2%  38.8% 
Bosnia - Republika Srpska (1)   31.1%  32.8%  34.5% 
Macedonia (1)   28.5%  30.9%  33.2% 
Portugal  28.1%  30.3%  37.3% 
Spain  28.0%  29.3%  38.0% 
Norway  27.5%  31.1%  37.5% 
Japan  26.0%  27.3%  29.5% 
United States  22.6%  25.7%  30.1% 
United Kingdom   19.9%  26.6%  32.8% 
Switzerland  15.9%  26.9%  31.7% 
Ireland  7.8%  14.0%  27.0% 
1. Values refer to 2009. 
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Table 8: Labor tax wedge for a one-earner couple with two children by level of average wage 
2008  
 
  Level of average wage 
  33%  50%  100% 
Sweden  41.8%  44.6%  47.9% 
Hungary  39.5%  43.4%  54.1% 
Bosnia – Federation  (1)   37.8%  37.8%  37.9% 
Serbia (1)   36.7%  38.0%  39.3% 
Finland  35.5%  38.0%  44.9% 
Bulgaria  35.1%  35.1%  35.1% 
Greece  34.4%  34.4%  39.8% 
Lithuania  34.4%  37.8%  41.1% 
Poland  33.7%  33.7%  33.7% 
Germany  33.4%  33.4%  42.8% 
Romania  32.9%  35.3%  40.9% 
Slovenia  32.9%  32.9%  35.8% 
France  32.5%  34.1%  45.1% 
Italy   31.5%  31.5%  40.2% 
Slovak Republic  31.4%  31.4%  33.2% 
Bosnia - Republika Srpska (1)   30.6%  30.6%  33.0% 
Macedonia (1)   28.5%  30.9%  33.2% 
Portugal  28.1%  28.1%  31.0% 
Spain  28.0%  28.0%  32.0% 
Estonia  26.9%  26.9%  31.3% 
Latvia  26.7%  26.7%  34.5% 
Netherlands  26.4%  33.4%  43.1% 
Belgium  23.6%  35.7%  47.0% 
Japan  22.6%  22.5%  26.1% 
Austria  22.0%  32.3%  44.7% 
Norway  20.9%  26.8%  35.3% 
United Kingdom   19.9%  26.6%  32.8% 
Czech Republic  17.7%  23.7%  31.0% 
United States  14.9%  11.9%  17.9% 
Switzerland  12.6%  15.2%  32.9% 
Ireland  7.8%  12.2%  18.5% 
1Values refer to 2009. 
Source: OECD Tax and Benefit model. 
 
 
42.  The transition from unemployment into formal work is not only affected by labor 
taxes that have to be paid on earned income but also by the loss of unemployment benefits 
which may, however, be partly compensated by in-work benefits. The average effective tax 
rate (AETR) of taking up a job is defined as the sum of income tax and social contributions, 
which have to be paid if the worker takes up a formal job minus the (net) social benefit,   21 
which  the  worker  loses  by  moving  out  of  unemployment.  High  replacement  rates  of 
unemployment  insurance  combined  with  high  labor  taxes  can  lead  to  relatively  high 
disincentives to take up formal employment. Calculations by Koettl et al. show that this is 
indeed  the  case  in  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Romania.  In  these  countries, 
workers who move from unemployment into employment sometimes face an effective tax 
rate of around 80% or more depending on family status, employment of the spouse, and wage 
levels; this means that there is hardly any income gain from taking up a formal job. 
Among the  four new EU member  countries,  which are also  members  of the OECD, the 
disincentives were highest in the Czech Republic, in particular if workers were offered a 
lower-paid  job  than  they  had  prior  to  becoming  unemployed.  Slovakia  increased  the 
incentives  to  take  up  formal  jobs  by  tightening  unemployment  benefits,  introducing  tax 
credits for workers (including for children of working families), and lowering labor taxation 
(OECD, 2007).  
 
43.  Tax disincentives can also be calculated for persons who are moving from informal 
work (without having received unemployment benefits but social assistance) into a formal 
job. In this case the average effective tax rate can also be denoted as the formalization tax 
rate (FTR). The progress report by Koettl presents results for the FTR showing that in all four 
countries the FTRs are very high. Under the assumption that the formalization of an informal 
job does not change labor costs, i.e. workers bear all labor taxes, it is estimated that workers 
would lose between 50 and 70 percent of their former income (informal wage plus social 
benefits). Similarly, if it is assumed that all labor taxes are borne by the employer, labor costs 
would have to increase by between 50 and 70 percent when the informal job is formalized. 
This analysis shows the existence of important informality traps in these countries. 
 
8. Are Flat Personal Income Taxes Reducing Undeclared Work?  
 
44.  More than half of the NM-EU countries have introduced flat income taxes (Table 9). 
The main objectives of these reforms were to stimulate economic growth and simplify the tax 
system; it was hoped that this would also help to increase tax compliance thus reducing 
undeclared income. The transition from a progressive to a flat personal income tax was often 
accompanied  by  a  reduction  of  the  corporate  income  tax  rate,  which  implied  a  general 
reduction  of  income  taxation,  although  in  some  cases  the  reduction  of  tax  rates  was 
accompanied by a broadening of the tax base.  
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Table 9: Flat taxes on personal income  
 
Country  Tax rate in 2009 in %  Flat tax introduced in … 
Estonia   21  1994 
Lithuania  15  1994 
Latvia  25  1995 
Slovakia  19  2004 
Romania  16  2005 
Czech Republic  15/23  2008 
Bulgaria  10  2008 
Macedonia   10  2007 
Albania  10  2007 
Russia  13  2001 
Serbia  12 (salary income)  2003 
Ukraine  15  2004 
Georgia  25 (in 2008 the personal 
income of before 12 percent 
and the social security 
contributions of before 20 
percent have been merged) 
2005 
 
45.  A few empirical studies have examined the effect of flat taxes on undeclared income. 
By  using  survey  questions,  Peter  (2008)  found  in  a  cross-country  study  that  transition 
countries that adopted the flat personal income tax experienced a significant decline in tax 
evasion after the tax reform. For Russia, which introduced a flat personal income tax in 2001 
(with  a  low  rate  of  13  percent),  Ivanova  et  al.  (2005)  find  that  compliance  increased 
substantially after the reform. But according to these authors, it remains unclear if this was 
due to the tax reform or to the accompanying changes in enforcement, which were taken at 
the same time. Gorodnichenko et al. (2007) confirm that after the introduction of the flat tax 
in  Russia  tax  evasion  declined  significantly.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  other  group  of 
researchers they argue that the improvement in compliance cannot be explained by changes 
in tax enforcement policies and was therefore caused by the introduction of the flat tax. 
Staehr (2009) finds for Estonia that labor participation elasticities are lower for high-income 
individuals than for lower income individuals. This suggests that a tax reform, which shifts 
the tax burden from from higher to lower income earners – as is generally the case with a 
revenue-neutral flat tax reform - reduces participation in the (formal) labor market. However, 
as the introduction of the flat tax was often not revenue-neutral and the elimination of the 
progressive rate schedule was accompanied by an increase in the basic allowance, its effect 
on  the  labor  market  and  on  tax  compliance  could  have  been  positive,  depending  on  the 
circumstances.    
 
46.  Given the various other factors that affect undeclared work, a flat income tax should 
not be seen as a ―magic bullet‖ for reducing undeclared work. Numerous studies suggest 
however, that reducing labor taxes - both with flat and with progressive income tax rates - 
tends to increase regular employment and improve tax compliance. If such tax reform is part 
of  a  package,  which  also  increases  effectiveness  of  tax  collection  and  improves  general 
framework conditions for business, there is a good chance that undeclared work declines. In 
the following section we look more closely at the situation in Estonia, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic, which have reformed their tax systems.  
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8.1 The Case of Estonia 
47.  According to the Statistical Office, in 2004 (the latest year available) undeclared work 
in Estonia was only 7.3 percent of GDP, down from 10 percent in 2001 and the lowest among 
the  NM-EU  countries.).  But  other  estimates  also  suggest  that  Estonia  has  been  rather 
successful in containing undeclared work as indicated below:  
 
  According to  Meriküll  and Staehr (2008), Estonia achieved a marked  drop in  the 
prevalence of unreported employment from 1998 to 2002 (from 19.5 percent to 9.6 
percent) while in  Latvia and in  Lithuania it increased (from 16.3 percent  to  22.5 
percent and from 7.2 percent to 11.7 percent respectively); 
  According to surveys by the Estonian Institute of Economic Research (EKI), the share 
of employees who regularly or occasionally receive envelope salaries declined from 
16 percent in 2003 to 12 percent in 2008. It is estimated that about 60,000 workers 
(almost 10 percent of total employment) are receiving envelope wages. EKI estimates 
that  in  2008  this  type  of  tax  evasion  reduced  revenue  from  social  insurance 
contributions and personal income tax by around 2.7 billion Estonian kroon or 1.1 
percent of GDP, while tax evasion from alcohol and cigarette excises was 0.8 billion 
kroon or 0.3 percent of GDP; 
  Undeclared work is most prevalent among small firms with low productivity, which 
can often only survive by evading at least part of their tax liability. Firms that pay 
envelope wages often also underdeclare sales, thus evading VAT and using cash from 
VAT  fraud  to  pay  envelope  wages.  According  to  EKI  estimates,  the  share  of 
undeclared  purchases  of  goods  and  services  (including  illegal  purchases)  declined 
from 13 percent of expenditures in 2000 to 7 percent in 2008; undeclared purchases 
were  most  frequent  in  construction  or  renovation  services  (30  percent),  computer 
software (29 percent), and tobacco products (25 percent). According to the Estonian 
Tax and Customs board (Eesti Maksu- ja Tolliamet, EMTA) estimates in 2007 VAT 
fraud amounted to  2.5 billion kroons  (1.1 percent  of GDP and 3 percent  of state 
revenue); it increased to almost 4 billion kroons (1.6 percent of GDP and 4.7 percent 
of state revenue) in 2008;  
  According to a 2008 survey by EKI, 15 percent of the employees who said that they 
are in favor of unrecorded salaries argued that the state has enough resources already 
and that unrecorded salaries are necessary for the company to survive in the current 
economic situation (57 percent) and/or that the tax burden is too high (56 percent); 
  Underdeclaration  of  income  is  also  widespread  among  the  self-employed  who 
represent,  however,  only  about  10  percent  of  all  employed  persons.  The  self-
employed often reduce their taxable income by declaring only part of their income 
and by deducting personal expenditures as business expenditures from the tax base. 
According to estimates by EMTA, the revenue loss (social contributions and personal 
income tax) from undeclared income from the self-employed amounted in 2008 to 
460 million kroons (0.2 percent of GDP);  
  Pensioners who continue working also often evade taxes. As they are covered by 
health insurance they do not need to declare their salaries in order to receive health 
care coverage and many of them do not pay taxes. 
  Kriz et al. (2007) also find that payroll and income tax evasion is most prevalent in 
small firms in the construction sector and in agriculture, among individuals who are   24 
working part-time, among the low-skilled including those with non-Estonian ethnicity, 
and among the young and the elderly.  
 
48.  All this suggests that the problem of undeclared work exists in Estonia, but it is not as 
big as in most other NM-EU countries. It appears that fighting undeclared work has been 
helped by several factors, such as favorable conditions for doing business, which led to high 
growth and job creation in the regular sector (before the recent crisis), supportive tax policies, 
and the modernization of tax collection.   
 
49.  Estonia has established favorable framework conditions for doing business, which 
have supported an improvement in the economy. Labor and product market regulations are 
not a major hindrance for employment in the formal sector; the minimum wage is relatively 
low  (in  2009  -  4350  kroons  or  less  than  300  €  per  month).  With  the  new  Labor  Code 
(beginning July 1, 2009) labor market flexibility has increased further.  
 
50.  After the mid-1990s the Estonian economy achieved high economic growth, which 
was only briefly interrupted by the Russian crisis in 1999. During 2000-2007, average annual 
growth  was  over  8  percent,  the  second  highest  among  the  NM-EU  countries,  and  only 
slightly lower than in Latvia (almost 9 percent). The per capita income level (GDP per capita 
in Purchasing Power standards) increased from 42 percent of the EU-27 average in 1997 to 
68 percent in 2007. In 2008 (after a decline to 67 percent) Estonia had the fourth highest per 
capita  income  level  among  the  NM-EU  countries  after  Slovenia  (90  percent),  the  Czech 
Republic (80 percent), and Slovakia (72 percent). Unemployment declined from 13.6 percent 
in  2000  to  4.7  percent  in  2007.  However,  this  period  of  high  growth  ended  abruptly  in 
2008/2009 when the Estonian economy was affected by the global crisis and fell into a deep 
recession with real GDP declining by 3.6 percent in 2008 and around 14 percent in 2009. 
Prior to this crisis, labor had become scarce, which strengthened the bargaining position of 
workers. As a result, workers did not have to settle for job offers with no or only partial 
social security coverage. But with the economic crisis in 2008/2009 labor market conditions 
deteriorated and unemployment increased, thus posing a risk that underdeclaration of wages 
in the formal sector would again increase and workers would take more informal jobs to 
make a living. 
 
51.  Estonia established a relatively simple and transparent tax system with a lower tax 
burden than most other NM-EU countries. It was the first European country to introduce a 
flat tax (in 1994), by eliminating the progressive income tax schedule and applying the same 
rate (originally 26 percent) to personal and corporate income. Up from 2005, the flat tax was 
gradually reduced to 21 percent and the personal basic exemption was more than doubled in 
nominal terms. Since 2000, retained profits became fully tax-exempt and only distributed 
profits are taxed. Despite high economic growth in the aftermath of the tax reform, the tax 
reductions did not lead to a Laffer curve effect. Revenues from the personal income tax and 
the corporate income tax declined from around 8 percent and around 2 percent of GDP in the 
second half of the 1990s to around 6 percent and 1.6 percent of GDP in 2004–2008. While 
the  flat  tax  reform  did  not  lead  to  higher  revenue,  it  enhanced  simplicity,  transparency, 
compliance, and is generally supported by the population and most political parties (OECD, 
2009). According to Staehr, most of the flat tax revenue in Estonia is raised from higher 
income groups with relatively low labor supply elasticities so that the adverse effect of this 
tax on employment is relatively small. The fact that elasticities are higher for low and middle 
incomes suggests that the past reductions of the flat tax rate and the doubling of the basic 
allowance have increased regular employment and thus contributed to reduce informal work,   25 
notably among middle and lower income earners. In 2009, Estonia continued to simplify the 
tax system by extending the standard VAT rate to more goods and services, which were 
previously taxed at the reduced rate. Furthermore, the reduced VAT rate was increased from 
5 percent to 9 percent.  
 
52.  The lowering of the overall tax burden also contributed to combating undeclared work 
by reducing incentives to evade tax  (direct effect) and contributing to higher growth and 
employment (indirect effect). During 2000-2007, the overall tax burden (as measured by tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP) was on average around 31 percent of GDP, down from 
above 36 percent in 1995. The lowering of the overall tax burden was the result of lower 
labor taxes (4 percentage points of GDP), and – to a lesser degree – lower capital taxation (by 
around 1 percentage point of GDP), while taxes on consumption remained broadly constant. 
 
53.  Estonia has – together with Slovakia – the lowest labor tax wedge among the NM-EU 
countries. But low-income earners who are most vulnerable to undeclared work are facing a 
somewhat higher labor tax wedge than the OECD average, although it is lower than the EU-
15 average and lower than in most other NM-EU countries. The labor tax wedge is relatively 
flat, increasing from around 37 percent of labor costs for lower wages (67 percent of average 
wage) to around 38 percent for average wages, and around 39 percent for higher wages (167 
percent  of  average  wage).  Social  security  contributions  (the  so-called  social  tax)  are  the 
largest component of the labor tax wedge and therefore tend to reduce (formal) employment 
more than the personal income tax. But the size of this effect also depends to what degree 
workers perceive these contributions as taxes or as savings (insurance premiums); in the latter 
case, workers would not respond by reducing labor participation.  
 
54.  Due to the various benefit reforms the link between contributions and benefits has 
been strengthened, which should in principle have raised the awareness of the positive effects 
of social security contributions, thus reducing incentives to underdeclare earnings. To this 
end a three-pillar pension system was introduced and unemployment insurance was reformed. 
The  pension  reform  implies  that  future  pension  benefits  are  linked  to  lifetime  social 
contributions  so  that  part  of  social  contributions  are  no  longer  taxes  (according  to  the 
classical definition) but (forced) savings to an insurance system. Furthermore, individuals 
(including  self-employed)  only  receive  public  health  insurance  if  a  minimum  social 
contribution  (social  tax)  has  been  paid;  exceptions  are  pensioners,  pregnant  women, 
individuals  under  19  years  old,  students,  and  dependent  spouses  of  an  insured  person. 
Maternity allowances are also linked to previous earnings.  
 
55.  Tax collection, which is under the authority of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board 
(EMTA), is  perhaps  the most modern of all EU countries.  It  has  been facilitated by the 
simplification of the tax system, administrative reforms, and the prevalence of e-government. 
Estonia´s rate of electronic filing (personal income tax - 85 percent in 2007, corporate income 
tax - 88 percent, and VAT - 90 percent) is not only the highest among the NM-EU countries 
but also among the highest in the world. As a result, Estonia belongs to a group of countries 
with relatively low costs of tax compliance, as measured by the time spent preparing, filing, 
and paying taxes.  EMTA collects all general taxes, custom duties, and (since 1999) social 
security contributions. This modernization of tax collection allowed EMTA to shift resources 
towards areas that help to ensure better compliance. In order to improve tax compliance, 
public procurement should only be carried out with those firms who do not have tax arrears. 
EMTA is working closely with the Estonian Labor Inspectorate to exchange risk analysis, 
and conduct joint operations, as well as cooperating with the Cititenship and Migration Board.   26 
EMTA applies a so-called client-based approach, by raising awareness for tax compliance, 
using risk-analysis to identify potential tax evaders, and contacting firms and individuals. For 
example, it sends ―notice-letters‖ to potential payers and receivers of envelope wages, which 
according to EMTA, increased tax revenues by 59 million kroons. The work of EMTA may, 
however, be hampered by the relatively low penalties on tax fraud and by the constraint that 
if it discovers criminal income gained by tax fraud it cannot confiscate this income. 
 
56.  Despite much progress  to  modernize the tax system  and tax administration, some 
features of the Estonian tax and benefit system continue to make it vulnerable to tax evasion 
and tax avoidance strategies. The fact that social contributions are (with a few exceptions) 
only paid by the employer reinforces the perception of workers that these contributions are 
general taxes on business rather than premiums for their social insurance. If the employer 
contribution (or part of it) would instead be transformed into an employee contribution (while 
at the same time raising the gross wage), workers´ perception of a link between contribtions 
and benefits could probably be strengthened. Currently, tax evasion is often initiated by 
the  employer,  as  a  means  to  reduce  labor  costs.  It has been argued that if employer 
contributions  are  transformed  into  employee  contributions,  workers  would  become  more 
aware of the relatively high labor tax wedge and would attempt to evade it; the relatively high 
evasion  by  the  self-employed  who  directly  pay  their  contributions  are  taken  as  a  prime 
example.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  self-employed,  contributions  of  employees  are  like 
those  of  employers  withheld  at  source  and  any  concealment  of  earnings  requires  that 
employers  and  employees  are  acting  jointly.  The  pressure  to  evade  contributions  would 
therefore  probably  decline  by  such  a  change,  as  social  security  coverage  is  more  in  the 
interest of employees than of employers. 
 
57.  The system of means-tested social benefits creates incentives to work informally even 
if these benefits are not very generous. But when workers take up a low-paying job they lose 
the full amount of the subsistence minimum allowance, thus phasing a 100 percent effective 
marginal tax rate and are therefore tempted to hide their income by working informally.  
 
58.  The tax exemption of retained profits aims at promoting investment. Given the boom 
in investment in the years prior to the recent crisis this objective has been achieved, although 
it is difficult to isolate the effect of the tax incentive from other factors (OECD, 2009 a.a.O.). 
By taxing corporate profits only when they are distributed as dividends (at the flat tax rate of 
21  percent)  this  tax  treatment  eliminates  double  taxation  of  dividends  and  prevents 
discrimination  of  equity-financed  investment  against  debt-financed  investment.  However, 
Estonia´s  system  of  corporate  taxation  goes  further  than  ensuring  tax  neutrality  between 
equity financed and debt financed investment as it is biased in favor of retained profits. The 
reason is that with the retention of profits the value of the firm rises, which is reflected in 
higher share prices so that capital gains accrue to the owners of the shares. Tax neutrality 
between equity-financed and debt-financed investment could in principle be achieved without 
taxing retained profits but in this case the effective tax rate on capital gains must be equal to 
the tax rate on interest income. While the statutory tax rate on capital gains is the same as on 
interest  income,  the  effective  tax  rate  is  much  lower;  the  reason  is  that  capital  gains  of 
shareholders are not taxed when they accrue but only when they are realized, which may be 
in a distant future. The bias in favor of retaining profits therefore creates a lock-in effect of 
capital, thus preventing the allocation of capital towards its most productive use. Furthermore, 
firms may use retained profits to invest in financial assets rather than in fixed investment, 
thus becoming more and more ―quasi banks‖ rather than productive enterprises. This tax   27 
treatment thus creates economic inefficiencies, leads to (legal) tax avoidance strategies, and 
reduces the tax base.  
 
59.  Inequity among taxpayers also arises between dependent workers and self-employed 
workers. Although the self-employed have to pay personal income tax and social security 
contributions  at  the  same  rates  as  dependent  workers,  they  have  more  opportunities  to 
underdeclare  income  and  also  benefit  from  generous  deductions  for  operating  costs. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the social security contributions for employees, there is a ceiling 
for social security contributions of the self-employed, which affects, however, only high-
income earners (earning more than 15 times the minimum wage). If the self-employed are 
organized as corporate firms, they also benefit from the lower capital taxation vis-à-vis labor 
taxation.  For example, some medical doctors are organized as corporate entrepreneurs and 
pay their income out as dividends rather than as wage, thus avoiding the higher labor tax. The 
gap between capital and labor taxation also encourages managers of firms to transform part 
of their wage into capital income and distribute it as dividends. According to estimates by 
EMTA the revenue loss caused by paying dividends instead of salaries amounted in 2007 to 
193 million kroons (0.1 percent of GDP). The Estonian financiel newspaper Äripäev (June 31, 
2009) reported that Estonian top lawyers earn most of their income as dividends and pay 
social tax only on 10-20 percent of income. 
 
8.2 The Case of Slovakia 
60.  Acccording to the Statistical Office, undeclared work in Slovakia was 13-15 percent 
of GDP in 2000 and declined only moderately in recent years, which places Slovakia in a 
middle position among the NM-EU countries with respect to the size of undeclared work..  
According  to  the  IMD  World  Competitiveness  report,  tax  evasion  in  Slovakia  is  less 
important for hampering business activity than in most other NM-EU countries (with the 
exception of the Czech Republic). 
 
61.  Slovakia  has  been  successful  in  implementing  profound  economic  reforms.  As  a 
result, framework conditions for firms in the formal sector are favorable. In the World Bank´s 
Doing Business report, it ranks a bit lower than the three Baltic States, but above the other 
NM-EU countries. In 2004, Slovakia implemented a fundamental tax reform, which was part 
of an overall economic reform including a reform of the labor market and a reform of social 
benefits.  The reform package aimed at  promoting  growth  and employment by increasing 
investment and incentives to work following the slogan ―making work pay‖. The main tax 
measures were the introduction of a flat personal income tax and the unification of its rate 
with the corporate income tax and the VAT at 19 percent. Before, the personal income tax 
had a progressive rate structure ranging from 10 to 38 percent, the corporate income tax had a 
standard rate of 25 percent and 15 and 18 percent reduced rates, and the VAT had a standard 
rate of 20 percent and a reduced rate of 14 percent. The flat personal income tax has a basic 
personal tax exemption, which is linked to the subsistence level and is reduced gradually at 
higher  incomes  and  phased  out  if  the  tax  base  is  equal  or  higher  than  100  times  the 
subsistence level. As a result the average tax rate increases with rising income thus making 
the income tax slightly progressive. However, as social security contributions are subject to a 
ceiling, the overall tax on labor becomes regressive at higher income levels. Furthermore, the 
tax bases of the personal and the corporate income tax were broadened by eliminating or 
reducing  exemptions  and  deductions.  Excises  on  mineral  oil,  beer,  and  tobacco  were 
increased while the tax on the transfer and assignment of real estate was abolished in 2005.  
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62.  Overall, the tax reform was designed as being broadly revenue neutral. Krajcir and 
Odo (2005) estimated shortly after the reform that – without considering any positive effects 
on the economy – it would reduce total tax revenues in the first year by approximately 0.5 
percent  of  GDP.  The  revenue  shortfall  from  income  tax  (personal  income  tax,  corporate 
income tax, and withholding tax) by around 30 percent (1.7 percent of GDP) would be partly 
compensated by higher revenues from VAT (0.9 percent of GDP) and excises of above one 
tenth (0.4 percent of GDP). It turned out that in the four years after the reform (2004-2007) 
the revenue from personal income tax (as a percent of GDP) was 0.8 percentage point lower 
than in the four years before while the revenue from corporate income tax was 0.2 percentage 
point higher. Revenue from VAT and excises increased by 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points. 
Total tax revenue declined by almost 3 percentage points of GDP with two thirds of the 
decline being caused by lower revenue from social contributions and one third by lower 
general taxes (Table 10).  As in the case of Estonia, the flat tax reform in Slovakia did not 
lead to a Laffer curve effect (which was also not expected) but to lower revenue as a percent 
of GDP. As government expenditure declined even faster (as a percentage of GDP) than 
revenues, Slovakia was able to reduce its general government budget deficit from above 7 
percent of GDP in the 2000-2003 to less than 3 percent in 2004 -2007, which also helped to 
join the Euro zone in 2009.  
 
Table 10: Tax revenue in Slovakia (annual averages as a percentage of GDP) 
 
  2000 to 2003  2004 to 2007 
Total taxes  33.4  30.5 
 Social contributions  14.2  12.3 
 Excl. social contributions    19.2  18.2 
  Direct taxes    7.3    6.1 
  Of which: Pers. Income tax       3.4    2.6 
                   Corp. income tax    2.6    2.8 
                   Other    1.4     0.7 
   Indirect taxes  11.9  12.1 
    Of which: VAT     7.2    7.5 
                     Excises     3.0    3.4 
                     other     1.7    1.2 
 
63.  The tax reform reduced taxes on income and shifted more of the tax burden onto 
consumption, which increased incentives to work and to save and thus helped to enhance 
economic growth (Brook and Leibfritz, 2005). Kracir and Odo (a.a.O.) estimated that the 
tax reform would increase growth of potential output by about ½ percentage point. Indeed, 
between 2004 and 2008, Slovakia has achieved an average annual growth of 8 percent, the 
highest of the new EU member countries. Employment increased by almost 3 percent per 
year while unemployment declined from around 18 percent in 2004 to below 10 percent in 
2008. The 2004 economic reform has certainly contributed to this remarkable performance, 
although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the tax reform  from that of other reforms, 
notably the labor market reform, the pension reform, and the reform of social assistance, as 
well  as  from  other  factors  that  were  not  related  to  the  reform,  particularly  favorable 
international economic development.  
 
64.  The introduction of the flat tax made it easier for taxpayers to comply with the tax 
code and thus helped reduce undeclared work, but the size of this effect remains unclear. The 
labor tax wedge declined for low-income earners due to the increase of the basic allowance, 
which left minimum wages free of personal income tax. The tax wedge also declined for   29 
high-income earners due to the elimination of the progressive rate structure. Average wage 
earners,  married  workers  with  children,  and  non-working  spouses  benefited  from  the 
refundable child benefit, while the tax wedge for single earners remained broadly constant.  
 
65.  In 2005, part of the pension contributions was redirected to the personal accounts of 
workers;  as  there  exist  property  rights  of  such  funds  these  contributions  are  no  longer 
considered in OECD statistics as labor taxes. The labor market effect of this measure is, 
however, not clear. As the ―forced savings‖ did not reduce labor costs, it had no positive 
effect on labor demand. A positive effect on employment could have, perhaps, resulted 
from  higher  labor  supply  but  only  if  workers  perceive  this  part  of  their  pension 
contribution as an insurance premium and not as a tax.  
 
66.  Overall, the tax reform of 2004 made the tax system simpler and more transparent. It 
also led, together with other changes, to a decline in the overall tax burden including the tax 
on labor. The tax reform and the tightening of social benefits should, in principle, have led to 
a significant decline in informal work, all the more as the economic growth was high and 
employment  increased  until  2007.  But  undeclared  work  appears  to  have  declined  only 
marginally since the reform, which suggests that there are also other factors at play. Indeed, 
many low-skilled workers remain unemployed, often with a long duration of unemployment 
and in particular in the less developed Eastern regions. These workers tend to have low skills, 
which reduces their productivity to below the minimum wage and have therefore difficulties 
finding a regular job. They are also reluctant to leave their region to find a job elsewhere. As 
a result, these people tend to resort to informal work.  
 
67.  While structural economic deficiencies may explain part of the informal economy in 
Slovakia,  some  undeclared  work  may  –  despite  the  profound  tax  reform  –  be  related  to 
taxation:  
  Despite  a  decline  in  recent  years,  the  labor  tax  wedge  for  low-income  earners 
continues  to  be  relatively  high.  As  social  security  contributions  (not  health 
insurance) are capped at higher incomes (before 3 and now 4 times the average wage) 
the labor tax is regressive;  
  The  significant  upward  step  of  the  income  tax  (19  percent)  just  after  the 
minimum wage may encourage workers to underdeclare wages by only declaring 
the minimum wage even if they earn more;  
  Some tax credits are linked to working in the regular sector and therefore ease the 
transition  of  families  from  non-employment  or  informal  employment  into  formal 
employment, notably the tax credit for taxpayers with dependent children and for a 
spouse whose taxable income is below the basic allowance level. This latter tax credit 
may, however, create incentives for the spouse to work informally so that the first 
earner can fully benefit from the tax credit for the spouse;  
  Another problem arises from the fact that self-employed workers benefit from a lower 
base of social security contributions, so that their labor tax wedge is lower than if they 
worked as employees, which encourages bogus self-employment.  
 
68.  The government responded to these problems by introducing a general employment 
tax credit in 2009, which reduces the effective labor tax wedge for lower incomes. In order to 
finance this measure the government discussed eliminating (or raising) the income ceilings 
and,  perhaps,  including  capital  income  in  the  base  for  social  contributions.  This  latter 
measure  would  also  help  discourage  people  from  transforming  labor  income  into  capital 
income but it would weaken the link between contributions and benefits.    30 
 
69.  While past tax reforms have made Slovakia´s tax system simpler and easier to obey, 
the system of tax collection has not kept pace, which makes it still cumbersome for taxpayers 
to comply. In Slovakia a typical firm needs 325 hours per year for the compliance of all 
business taxes while in Estonia only 81 hours are neded. As a result, Slovakia ranks much 
lower (126
th) with respect to paying taxes in the World Bank‘s Doing Business report than 
Estonia (34
th) despite similar tax rates. The government is now in cooperation with the World 
Bank  preparing  a  reform  of  tax  collection  (UNITAS),  which  after  full  implementation 
(planned  for  2014)  will  unify  the  collection  of  general  taxes  and  social  insurance 
contributions, as is already the case in Estonia and some other NM-EU countries (Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia). 
 
8.3 The Case of the Czech Republic 
70.  The Czech Rebublic appears to be among those NM-EU countries that have made 
some  progress  in  containing  undeclared  work.  Acccording  to  the  Statistical  Office, 
undeclared work in the Czech Republic was 9-10 percent of GDP in 2006/2007, the second 
lowest after Estonia, with no change in recent years. According to the business surveys for 
the IMD World Competitiveness report, in the Czech Republic tax evasion is a less important 
factor for hampering business activity than in the other NM-EU countries.  
 
71.  Some  characteristics  of  the  Czech  economy  and  economic  policy  have  helped  to 
contain  undeclared  work.  The  relatively  highly  skilled  workforce  amd  moderate  wage 
policies with a view towards maximizing employment have eased structural adjustments. As 
a result, employment in the formal sector has - prior to the recent economic crisis - remained 
at a relatively high level, which reduced the pressure on workers to work informally. The 
relatively low unemployment during and after economic transformation has led people to 
speak of a ―Czech miracle‖.
9  
 
72.  Although undeclared work may be less pervasive than in some other countries of the 
region it does exist in various forms (Münich, 2007). Hanousek and Palda (2008) have 
carried out regular surveys, asking people whether they evaded taxes and whether they expect 
others to do so. They find that in the Czech Republic between 1995 and 2006 the percentage 
of tax evaders first increased, then leveled off and then declined thanks to structural changes 
and better macroeconomic conditions. Underdeclaration of work is widespread among the 
self-employed,  registered  unemployed,  and  even  among  workers  with  regular  jobs.  Low 
skilled workers are more affected than higher skilled workers although tax evasion among the 
latter has also increased. Horáková and Kux (2003) also found that undeclared work is most 
widespread among the self-employed, small enterprises, low-skilled workers, and workers 
with secondary jobs. There is also anecdotal evidence of illegal employment of foreigners, 
notably  from  Ukraine.  The  sectors  most  affected  by  undeclared  work  are  construction, 
agriculture, catering, retail trade, and textiles. In 2007 about 40 percent of all workers in the 
construction sector  worked as  self-employed and that over 150,000 of the self-employed 
workers in the construction sector could in principle perform their contracted work also as 
dependent employees. Between one eighth and one fourth of all self-employment in the 
                                                 
9 During the first phase of transition there was, however, also considerable ―hidden unemployment‖ of workers 
in state-owned enterprises who added little to production and kept registered unemployment at artificially low 
levels.   31 




73.  The  main  reasons  for  the  relatively  high  level  of  self-employed  and  bogus  self-
employed are, besides more labor flexibility for the main contractor, the lower tax costs. 
Although the statutory labor tax rates (personal income tax and social insurance contribuions) 
are the same for employees and self-employed the latter benefit from the lower tax base. The 
base for social security contributions was in 2006 only 50 percent of profits and in 2004 and 
2005 only 40 percent and 45 percent, respectively. It is also easier for the self-employed to 
underdeclare  earnings  by  deducting  personal  expenses  as  business  expenses  or  non-
declaration of sales. As a result, many of the self-employed simply declare the minimum 
wage,  which  is  required  to  receive  social  insurance  coverage.  According  to  model 
calculations  by  Prusa  et  al.  (2009),  the  self-employed  in  the  Czech  Republic  face  a 
particularly low effective tax burden; in 2005, the calculated unit tax costs (comprising all 
labor taxes) for self-employed was only around 23 percent while for workers in corporations 
it  was  around  41  percent.  The  ratio  between  unit  tax  costs  of  the  self-employed  and 
dependent employed is thus only around 56 percent, the lowest among the 19 EU countries 
that were considered in the study. In Hungary this ratio is 64 percent and in Slovakia it was 
around 66 percent.  Among the countries considered, Denmark has the most balanced tax 
treatment between the self-employment and dependent employed (with a ratio between the 
unit tax costs of around 92 percent).  
 
74.  Recent  reforms,  notably  the  2007  and  2008  tax  and  welfare  reforms,  aimed  at 
fostering growth and employment. The main measures were: 
  The introduction of a flat personal income tax in 2008. The progressive tax schedule 
with four tax brackets of 12, 19, 25 and 32 percent was replaced by a uniform tax rate 
of 15 percent. However, as social insurance contributions are now included in the 
personal  income  tax  base,  the  tax  rate  as  calculated  on  a  conventional  base  (i.e. 
excluding social contributions) is not 15 percent but 23 percent;  
  Tax credits (including the basic tax credit) and allowances for working low-income 
groups were increased. The regular child benefit, which was before income-dependent 
and granted to all families with children will no longer be income-dependent and will 
only be granted to families with income below a threshold;  
  A ceiling on the base for social contributions was introduced (set at four times the 
avearage salary). The already existing cap for the self-employed will be raised to this 
level;  
  The corporate income tax rate is gradually lowered from 24 percent in 2007 to 19 
percent in 2010 and the tax base will be expanded;  
  The reduced VAT rate was raised from 5 percent to 9 percent; 
  Unemployment benefits were tightened;  
  The retirement age in the pension system will be raised further to 65 years and the 
qualifyfing perios is raised from 25 to 35 years.   
 
75.  It is too early to fully assess the impact of these reforms on the labor market and on 
tax  evasion.  Our  tentative  assessment  is  that  the  reforms  ease  the  transition  from 
unemployment and informal work into regular jobs due to lower effective average tax rates 
on low incomes. But workers with wages just below average are discouraged to increase 
                                                 
10 The name comes from an entrepreneur, called Mr. Svarc, who at the beginning of the 1990s  replaced 
employees by self-employed. Due to  lower taxes and labor costs he could offer the workers higher net earnings.      32 
work efforts, as effective marginal tax rates are relatively high due to  the withdrawal of 
income dependent tax credits. With respect to undeclared work there are also positive and 
negative effects so that the net effect is ambiguous: The creation of more regular jobs will 
reduce informality and evasion while the higher effective marginal tax rates for some income 
groups tends to increase under-decaration of regular earnings in order not to lose benefits. 
Higher income earners who benefit from the new caps on social security contributions face 
lower marginal tax rates and have therefore fewer incentives to under-declare earnings. But 
the reforms do little to address the problem of low tax payments by the self-emploed.  
 
76.  The system of tax collection is particularly cumbersome in the Czech Republic, which 
may also contribute to tax evasion. According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, 
a typical firm in the Czech Republic needs 930 hours per year for the compliance of 
taxes. This is the worst performance among the NM-EU countries and brings the Czech 
Republic to the seventh lowest rank of the all the 181 countries covered in this report. The 
government is responding to this problem and is now preparing a reform of tax collection in 
cooperation with the World Bank aiming at unifying the collection of general taxes, custom 
duties,  and  social  insurance  contributions,  which  should  help  to  considerably  ease  tax 




9. Employment Tax Credits Provide Incentives to Take up Declared 
Work but Disincentives to Increase It 
 
77.  As part of a strategy of “Making Work Pay”, some countries inside and outside the 
region are granting an employment tax credit (such as the employment tax credits in Hungary, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, the US Earned Income Tax Credit, and the UK Working Family 
Tax Credit). This measure directly reduces the income tax (or in the Netherlands also the 
social security contribution) liability of workers and can be designed as ―refundable‖ or ―non-
refundable‖. If refundable, the worker receives the positive difference between the amount of 
the tax credit and of the tax liability in cash while with a non-refundable tax credit he/she can 
(at the maximum) reduce his tax liablility to zero. The tax credit is generally proportional to 
gross earnings up to a maximum amount and is – after a threshold – gradually withdrawn.  
 
78.  As the tax credit increases the after-tax income difference between working in the 
formal sector and not working or working informally, it provides an incentive to work in the 
formal sector. As in most of the new EU countries, labor taxes are relatively high even for 
low wage earners who are most vulnerable to informality; an employment tax credit could be 
an effective measure to combat informality. However, a generous employment tax credit can 
lead to high fiscal costs and also to high deadweight costs as those workers who are already 
working in the formal sector also benefit. Furthermore, as the tax credit is generally phased 
out at higher incomes, it raises the marginal effective tax rate (which is composed of the 
marginal labor tax rate and the benefit withdrawal rate) for incomes, which are affected by 
the phasing-out, which creates disincentives to increase work efforts and incentives to under-
declare earnings in order to (fully) benefit from the tax credit. The risk of excessive marginal 
tax rates is biggest in countries where the labor tax wedge at low incomes is high so that the 
withdrawal of the tax credit can lead to extremely high effective marginal tax rates. For 
example, in Hungary the gradual withdrawal of the tax credit increases the effective marginal   33 
labor tax wedge to above 75 percent (Figure 3). A few countries, such as Sweden and the 
Netherlands are therefore granting employment tax credits for all workers, i.e. without any 
phasing-out. This prevents an increase of the marginal labor tax wedges, which are already 
relatively high in these countries, notably in Sweden. The drawback of such generous tax 
credits is, however, that both deadweight costs and fiscal costs are higher than with targeted 
tax credits. For Sweden, the fiscal  costs of the employment have been estimated at 1 ½ 
percent of GDP. 
 
 




10. The Tax Treatment of Families Can Provide Disincentives for 
Secondary Earners to Declare Income 
 
79.  The income tax treatment of families together with family benefits can affect the 
choice to participate in the formal labor market and to declare secondary earnings. If the unit 
in personal income taxation is the household, there is joint filing.  This implies that the first 
unit of income of the secondary earner (typically the wife) is subject to the high marginal tax 
rate,  which  is  determined  by  her  husband‘s  income.  The  joint  taxation  can  thus  be  a 
disincentive for the secondary earner to enter the labor market and encourage her/him to 
work informally.  
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80.  However, with a few exceptions, this source of undeclared income does not appear to 
be a major problem in the countries that are considered here. The reason is that many of the 
countries have a flat income tax so that the marginal tax rate is the same for all incomes. And 
in those countries with progressive income taxes, family members are taxed individually (as 
in  Hungary  and  Slovenia)  or  can  opt  for  individual  or  joint  taxation  (as  in  Poland). 
Furthermore, in Poland, working lone parents benefit from joint taxation as it allows income 
splitting  with  their  children,  which  reduces  their  tax  liability  and  therefore  provides  an 
incentive to work in the formal sector. However, in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, work 
disincentives (and incentives to underdeclare secondary earnings) could arise from tax credits 
for spouses, as these are granted independent from any declared income of the spouse. These 
tax credits are part of family policy and aim at raising income of families by reducing their 
tax liability. As the tax credit for a non-working spouse can be fully used by the primary 
worker, it creates incentives for the spouse not to work or to under-declare her/his earnings, 
as the declaration would increase the tax burden of the primary earner. Maintaining the tax 
credit for the working spouse while phasing the tax credit for the non-working spouse out at 
higher incomes would encourage secondary earners to enter the labor market. The objective 
of family policy would still be met as net income of low and middle-income families would 
not be reduced.  
 
11. Simplified Tax Regimes Can Ease Tax Compliance but Create New 
Loopholes 
 
81.  With the objective to ease the burden of taxes and other regulations, governments 
often provide preferential  treatment  and simplifications,  such as  presumptive taxation  for 
SMEs  and  the  self-employed.  This  policy  encourages  entrepreneurship,  which  was  an 
important  policy  objective  particularly  during  the  first  stage  of  transition  to  a  market 
economy. It also reduces compliance costs for taxpayers and helps the tax administration to 
collect revenue from the hard-to-tax-sectors and eases the transition from informal to formal 
work, thus bringing more people under the tax net and into social security coverage. However, 
such preferences also encourage individuals to avoid or evade taxes, by shifting their work 
into the preferential status, such as from dependent employment into self-employment or 
―false‖  or  ―bogus‖  self-employment.  Furthermore,  subsidizing  small  firms  with  low 
productivity can encourage an inefficient firm structure with too many small firms. The gains 
of simplified tax regimes must therefore be weighed against these risks. 
 
82.  The share of self-employed in total employment varies considerably among the NM-
EU countries (Table 11). It is highest in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria (between around 27 
and 31 percent) and lowest in Estonia and Slovakia (between 9 and 13 percent). In several 
countries the share of self-employed has declined between 1995 and 2007 (notably in Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland) while in a few others it has increased (notably in Slovakia and to 
a smaller degree in Estonia). The different degree of self-employment can be due to different 
structures  of  the  economies  but  may  also  reflect  other  factors,  which  may  differ  across 
countries,  such  as  the  lower  labor  costs  of  self-employment  due  to  lower  labor  taxes  as 
compared with employees and the increased labor market flexibility for firms due to rigid 
labor codes for employees. The characteristics of self-employment and corresponding tax 
treatments in the various countries are discussed in detail below. 
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83.  In Hungary, entrepreneurs or contract workers with annual gross revenue below a 
certain  amount  can  choose  the  simplified  entrepreneurs´  tax  (EVA).  Under  EVA, 
entrepreneurs are not required to record their expenses and pay a flat income tax rate of 25 
percent.  Paying EVA eliminates all other income tax or levy on their business activity, 
besides social security contributions, which are allowed to be paid only on the minimum 
wage, independent of actual income (although higher payments to social security are also 
allowed). EVA subjects must add VAT (usually 20%) to their invoices, but they neither make 
VAT payments to the tax office nor can they claim tax credits on their inputs.  Cultural 
workers acting as employees can opt for the EKHO scheme, which also provides a simplified 
and favorable tax treatment. For individuals who are taxed under EVA and EKHO schemes, 
labor tax wedges are significantly lower than for normal employees with the difference being 
particularly large for higher income earners; the labor tax wedge for high income earners in 
the EVA scheme is less than 20 percent as compared with above 60 percent  for normal 
(dependent) employees with the same income (Leibfritz 2008).  The main reason for the 
lower  tax  wedge  is  that  the  income  tax  rate  is  flat  and  social  security  contributions  are 
allowed to be based on the minimum wage, while for employees the personal income tax is 
progressive  and  social  security  contributions  are  proportional  to  income  and  –  for  the 
employer contribution – without any cap.  While the favorable tax treatment of the special 
schemes provide an incentive to move from the informal into the formal employment, it also 
creates a big incentive to shift activity from dependent employment into self-employment in 
order to classify for these schemes.  Furthermore, as taxpayers in these schemes cannot claim 
VAT credits on their inputs they have no incentive to ask for an invoice from their suppliers.  
With a tax base defined as ―VAT-increased revenues‖, these individuals may also under-
declare revenues by not giving a receipt to their clients.  
 
84.  In Poland, unincorporated SMEs and self-employed can choose (in agreement with 
tax authorities) either to be taxed at the uniform 19 percent tax rate (general regime) or to pay 
a lump-sum tax (presumptive tax regime) where the tax turnover (registered revenues) and 
the tax rate varies according to the nature of the business; the lump-sum tax is in most cases 
below the CIT and PIT rates on capital income of 19 percent. In the general regime, firms can 
deduct wage costs as expenses, which raises the incentive to declare employees. This is not 
the case in the presumptive tax regime, which makes it more vulnerable to tax evasion. Self-
employed individuals (own-account workers or sole traders) are entitled to a flat-rate tax of 
19 percent on their declared income, as compared to the progressive rate structure applicable 
to labor income of dependent employees. Furthermore, as it is difficult for the tax authorities 
to  assess  actual  earnings,  the  self-employed  may  pay  only  a  minimum  social  security 
contribution, based on the minimum wage, which corresponds to 60 percent of the average 
wage. In 2005, the social insurance base of the newly self-employed was reduced for the first 
24 months to 30 percent of the minimum wage. As a result of all these measures the self-
employed tend to  have  a much lower tax wedge than regular employees.  There is  some 
anecdotal evidence that firms are encouraging their dependent employees to turn into (false) 
self-employed in order to reduce taxes. In order to fight such fictitious self-employment, the 
government has tightened the eligibility criteria and it has also reduced the tax wedge for 
employees  (OECD,  2008).    Another  source  for  tax  avoidance  and  evasion  is  the  social 
insurance scheme for farmers (KRUS) according to which farmers pay a flat rate contribution 
so  that their labor tax  burden is  significantly lower than  for non-farm workers  and self-
employed.  This encourages people to hold small plots of land in order to classify as farmers 
even  if  they  are  not  actively  working  as  farmers  (World  Bank,  2001).  It  also  increases 
informal work in rural areas and creates disincentives to move out of farming into more 
productive sectors.   36 
 
85.  In the Czech Republic, self-employed also benefit from a lower labor tax wedge due 
to a lower tax base for social insurance contributions, which is only half that of employees. 
According to a survey by the Research Institute for Labor and Social Affairs (Výzkumný 
Ústav Práce a Sociálních Vĕcí, RILSA), the number of ―false‖ self-employment (in Czech 
labelled  as  ‗švarcsystém‘)  amounted  to  100,000  in  2006-2007.  Experts  from  the  Czech 
Chamber of Commerce (Hospodářská komora ČR, HK ČR) estimate that this figure could be 
significantly higher at 200,000 workers. These figures represented between 13 and 26 percent 
of the 750,000 self-employed individuals in the Czech Republic in 2007. This type of work 
contract  is  not  common  among  large  firms  but  more  among  medium-sized  and  smaller 
companies. According to the survey by RILSA, despite short-term benefits for the firms, over 
the longer-term this type of labor contract also carries risks as competitiveness could decline 
due to insufficient training and lack of loyalty. Furthermore, due to lower social insurance 
benefits, the self-employed face a higher poverty risk over the longer-term.  
 
86.  In the Slovak Republic, self-employed workers also benefit from a lower labor tax 
wedge, as their tax base for social security contributions is only half of the average monthly 
taxable income of the previous year. This encourages bogus self-employment and has led to a 
nationwide discussion on false self-employment during the preparation of the amendments to 
the Labor Code in 2006/2007. The main critique was the insufficient social protection of 
involuntary self-employed workers. The policy objective is  to  eliminate involuntary self-
employment.  
 
87.  In Latvia, there is an ongoing debate about the need to simplify the tax regime for 
SMEs and thereby remove incentives for undeclared work. Self-employed workers have to 
register with the State Revenue Service (Valsts Ieņēmumu Dienests, VID) and to record all 
economic activities (income, costs) in a special record book. Self-employed persons, who 
work  as  individual  businesspersons,  are  required  to  register  themselves  with  the  local 
government.  They  are  personally  responsible  for  paying  personal  income  tax  and  social 
contributions.  The  record  book  helps  the  VID  to  control  tax  payments.  However,  the 
contracting company can also directly pay taxes for the self-employed, although this is not 
obligatory.  The  personal  income  tax  is  15  percent  of  business  income  of  self-employed 
people, which is lower than the tax rate on wage income (25 percent). The self-employed 
benefit from the fact that they can optimize personal tax payments more effectively than 
employed persons because they have less restrictive rules for reporting individual costs. For 
example, they may reduce their taxable income by including in their deductible expenses 
transportation costs from and to the workplace, part of living space rent, communication costs 
(telephone, internet), etc. The social contribution rate is 29.95 percent of the payroll for self-
employed people, compared with 33.09 percent of the payroll for employees. In general, the 
majority of social contributions (25 percentage points) is paid by the employer and only 9 
percentage  points  is  paid  by  the  employee,  while  self-employed  persons  pay  the  whole 
contribution. Self-employed people do not need to pay social contributions if their monthly 
income  is  below  a  threshold  (in  2009  EUR  213).  If  it  exceeds  this  threshold,  social 
contributions must be paid at least from this amount, and it is up to self-employed person to 
decide how much to pay for social contributions from the exceeding amount. The amount of 
payment is strongly correlated to the level of social benefits (including old age pension), 
payable to self-employed workers. There is anecdotal evidence that some employers force 
workers  to  accept  the  status  of  self-employed  in  order  to  reduce  labor  costs  and 
sometimes  these  people  work  without  a  contract,  and  without  any  social  security 
coverage.    37 
 
88.  In Estonia, social security is financed by income-related contributions (social tax) and 
by state transfers. Self-employed persons have to pay contributions to the general pension 
scheme and to health insurance. They can also join, on a voluntary basis, the unemployment 
insurance. The self-employed have a somewhat simplified tax regime as they can declare 
their income once a year and they are able to use cash basis, but the rates for personal income 
tax  and  social  contributions  are  the  same  as  for  dependent  workers.  However,  the  self-
employed  use  various  opportunities  to  evade  or  avoid  labor  taxation  so  that  their  actual 
contribution to government revenue remains very small. There is also some evidence that part 
of self-employment, notably in the construction sector, is forced self-employment. This has 
initiated a discussion about the insufficient social security coverage of these workers and 
measures have been taken to improve the situation. For example, the self-employed have 
obtained a right to join the second pillar of the pension insurance scheme. 
 
89.  In Lithuania, self-employed persons are generally covered on a compulsory basis only 
by  pension  social  insurance  to  receive  the  basic  pension  and,  if  their  income  (and 
contribution) exceeds a certain amount, also the supplementary pension. By paying national 
social insurance contributions these individuals acquire a right to receive old-age pensions 
and  disability  pensions.  Individuals  having  obtained  business  certificates  or  individual 
activity  certificates  for  certain  types  of  business  also  have  to  pay  health  insurance 
contributions on an obligatory basis. Until 2008, the self-employed benefited from a lower 
personal  income  tax  (15  percent)  as  compared  to  employees  (24  percent)  but  with  the 
reduction of the personal income tax rate in 2009 to 15 percent this preferential treatment was 
abolished. 
 
Table 11: Self-employed as a percentage of total employment 
  1995  2000  2005  2006  2007 
Bulgaria  .  28.2  27.8  27.2  26.6 
Czech Rep.  13.8  17.4  18.2  18.2  18.2 
Estonia  6.9  9  8.1  8.1  9.1 
Latvia  14.9  15  11.6  11.7  10.8 
Lithuania  18.8  19.7  17.1  15.8  13.7 
Hungary  17.8  15.1  13.8  12.7  12.4 
Poland  34.5  36.2  28.3  27.9  26.8 
Romania  .  .  33.5  31.7  31 
Slovenia  18.8  18.5  17.6  17.4  17 
Slovakia  6.6  8.3  13  13  13.2 
EU-27  17.9  16.7  16.3  16.1  15.9 
Sources: Eurostat: National Accounts Statistics; Research Institute for Labor and Social Affairs (RILSA), Prague. 
12. Effective Tax Administration Is a Precondition for Combating 
Undeclared Work 
 
90.  An effective tax administration is crucial for reducing tax evasion. It requires a high 
quality and sufficient quantity of staff and its efficient allocation among the various functions, 
notably auditing; this increases the risk of tax evaders being caught. However, relying only 
on stronger enforcement has an ambiguous effect: while it forces some firms into compliance, 
others may drop out of the market or go underground. Besides its revenue raising objective, 
tax administration must therefore also consider its service function for taxpayers, so that they 
can meet their obligations without undue costs. The task of tax administration is easier if the 
tax burden is relatively low and the system is relatively simple and when withholding taxes   38 
are widely used. This section compares a few indicators of tax collection, which may shed a 
first light at the effectiveness of tax administrations in the various countries. It does not aim 
at fully asssessing the effectiveness of tax administration in the NM-EU countries as this 
would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
91.  Giving the tax administration the responsibility to collect and audit not only taxes but 
also social insurance contributions can lead to significant synergy effects and help reduce 
under-declared  work.  This  can  reduce  administrative  costs  for  both  taxpayers  and  the 
administration  and  reduce  evasion  and  fraud  through  better  crosschecking  and  auditing. 
Countries with integrated tax and social security contribution collection in the region are 
Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia. In Slovakia, the 
Czech  Republic,  Poland,  and  Lithuania  social  insurance  contributions  are  still  collected 
separately  by  social  security  institutions.  As  mentioned  above,  Slovakia  and  the  Czech 
Republic are planning to introduce integrated collection systems.
11 The integration of revenue 
collection in these two countries is suported by the World Bank as was also the case in the 
other  countries.  For  example,  the  Bulgaria  Revenue  Administration  Reform  project, 
supported by the World Bank, started in 2003 and is now fully implemented. The results of 
this reform appear to be very promising and compliance has increased (World Bank, Bulgaria, 
February 2009).  
 
92.  The effectiveness of collecting social insurance contributions varies considerably in 
the  region.  Table  12  compares  the  implicit  ―productivity‖  of  the  social  insurance 
contributions, calculated as the ratio between the revenue yield (as a percent of GDP) and the 
combined contribution rate (in percent). This indicator is, however only a very crude proxy 
for the effectiveness of collecting social contributions; it is also affected by the design of 
social security contributions, such as income ceilings and – most importantly – by the size of 
undeclared work. In Estonia, one percentage point of contribution rate yields 0.38 percent of 
GDP as revenue while in Romania it yields only 0.2 percent of GDP. Estonia receives higher 
revenue than Romania although Romania´s contribution rate is 19 percentage points higher 
and it receives similar revenue as Slovakia, which has a more than 15 percentage point higher 
contribution rate.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Examples of integrated collection systems in other counties are United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Norway, Sweden, Italy, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. By contrast in Germany, France and Belgium, 
social security institutions collect social contributions.   39 
Table 12: Productivity of social insurance contributions (2008) 
Country  Revenue (% of GDP) 
(1) 
Total social security rate (%) 
(2) 
Implicit productivity: 
(1) divided by (2) 
Estonia  12.6  33.0  0.38 
Slovenia  14.3  38.2  0,37 
Czech 
Republic 
16.2  45.0  0.36 
Poland  11.4  37.7  0.30 
Hungary  13.9  50.5  0.28 
Lithuania  9.3  34.0  0.27 
Latvia  8.8  33.1  0.27 
Slovakia  12.1  48.6  0.25 
Bulgaria  8.1  34.4  0.24 
Romania  10.3  52.0  0.20 
Note: The total social contribution rate is the sum of employer and employee contribution rates to public 
insurances for old-age pensions, sickness, work injury and unemployment. 
 
93.  Another crude proxy for the effectiveness of tax collection is the VAT revenue ratio. 
It is defined as the ratio between the actual value added tax (VAT) revenue collected and the 
revenue that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final 
consumption. The gap between the potential and the actual VAT revenue does, however, not 
only  reflect  tax  but  is  also  affected  by  tax  exemptions,  reduced  rates,  and  other  special 
regimes.  Figure  4  shows  that  among  the  NM-EU  countries  for  which  we  have  this 
information, Slovenia has the highest VAT Revenue Ratio, followed by the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland.  
 










































































































*  The VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR) is defined as the ratio between the actual value added tax (VAT) revenue 
collected and the revenue that would theoretically be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final 
consumption. This ratio gives an indication of the efficiency of the VAT regime in a country compared to a 
standard norm. The calculation for Canada is for federal VAT only and the OECD aggregate is an unweighted 
average of data for the countries shown. 
**  2007 for Slovenia. 
Source: OECD (2009). 
 
94.  Tax compliance costs vary considerably among the NM-EU countries. According to 
the World Bank´s Doing Business Report, the time spent by a model firm on tax compliance 
is lowest in Estonia, which also has a good ranking worldwide. The reasons are that – as 
mentioned above – the tax system is relatively simple, the overall tax burden is relatively low 
and tax collection is centralized and eased by electronic tax declarations. By contrast, the 
Czech Republic has the highest compliance costs among the NM-EU countries and also ranks 
poorly worldwide (Table 13).     40 
 
Table 13: Ease of paying taxes: Time spent on tax compliance 
 
  Hours spent per 













Of which: Hours 
spent on labor 
taxes 
Estonia  81 (17)   34 
Lithuania  166 (58)  76 
Croatia  196 (68)  96 
Romania  202 (74)  110 
Slovenia  260 (101)  96 
Latvia  279 (117)  165 
Slovakia  325 (129)  120 
Hungary  330 (132)  203 
Poland  418 (151)  228 
Bulgaria  616 (167)  288 
Czech Republic  930 (174)  420 

































Source: World Bank, Paying Taxes 2009 - The global picture. 
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13. Other Framework Conditions also Affect Undeclared Work 
 
95.  The effectiveness of tax policies and tax administration in tackling undeclared work 
also depends on improvements in other policy areas. In the following we briefly discuss the 
importance of educational level of the labor force, the role of wage-setting, the regulatory 
burden for doing business, and of corruption. This suggests that addressssing the problem of 
undeclared  work  requires  a  broad  approach  and  depends  on  country-specific  conditions. 
Focusing only on tax policies while other barriers to formalization continue may not achieve 
its objective.  
 
13.1 Skill level of the workforce  
96.  The skill level of workers affects the chance of finding a job in the formal sector. A 
low educational attainment therefore increases the risk of long-term unemployment or of 
working  permanently  in  the  informal  sector.  The  impact  of  educational  attainment  on 
informal  work  has  been  shown  for  a  number  of  developed  and  less  developed  countries 
including Bulgaria (Ahn and de la Rica, 1997; Cappariello and Zizza 2009; Peracci et al., 
2007; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2005; Barth and Ognedal, 2005). Comparing various indicators, 
educational attainment (such as primary education drop-out rates and PISA results) across 
our  country  group  shows  that  the  level  of  eduction  in  Romania  and  in  Bulgaria  is 
significantly lower than in the other countries. In Romania, the group of Roma children has a 
particularly low level of education and a very high risk of being permantly excluded from the 
formal labor market. Educational attainment also differs among the other countries but the 
differences are less marked and also depend on the indicators used. Taken as a whole, the 
level of education appears to be somewhat higher in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Poland, and Hungary than in the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Croatia, and Lithuania.  
 
13.2 Wage-setting  
97.  High labor taxes tend to reduce employment in the formal sector and shift labor into 
the informal sector. The size of these effects also depends on labor market institutions and 
economic conditions. In countries where wages are flexible, labor taxes (including employer 
contributions to social security) tend to be borne by workers who accept a lower net wage in 
order to prevent an increase in labor costs, which could put their job at risk. Some of these 
workers may then increase their efforts to recoup the fall in disposable income so that their 
labor supply increases (income effect) but other workers reduce their work efforts as net 
earnings fall or they prefer to work informally where they can earn more than in the formal 
sector (substitution effect). The net effect on employment and informality therefore depends 
on  the  relative  size  of  these  opposing  effects.  Empirical  studies  have  shown  that  the 
substitution effect dominates (in particular for second earners, such as married women) so 
that labor supply in the formal sector declines as a result of high labor taxes and labor supply 
may then shift to some extent to the informal sector.  
 
98.  In the new EU countries, where trade unions appear to be weaker than in the old EU 
countries, wages appear to be more flexible, which has a positive impact on employment. 
However, as salaries in regular jobs are often perceived as being too low, workers attempt to 
get secondary jobs in the informal sector and/or under-declare their regular earnings. These   42 
workers thus recoup the relatively low income from their regular jobs, which arises from both 
from their low bargaining power and their high labor tax burden, by evading taxes.  
 
99.  In order to guarantee minimum living standards, several countries, including those in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  are  setting  minimum  wages  through  legislation  or  social 
agreements. Minimum wages can affect undeclared income in various ways, depending on 
their level. When minimum wages are set at a relatively low level, they are not detrimental 
for job creation in the formal sector. If firms only declare the minimum wage and pay an 
additional undeclared ―envelope‖ wage, the potential for this  type of undeclared work is 
higher the lower the minimum wage is set. This has led some countries to raise the minimum 
wage as a measure to reduce under-declaration of income. But this policy is risky. The reason 
is that firms may evade the higher minimum wage (which is set per hour) by showing in their 
books less hours than have actually been worked; for these firms, the minimum wage is just 
another level of bureaucracy that has to be dealt with (Ram et al. 2004). Other firms are 
forced by the higher minimum wage to increase prices in order to cover cost and if this is not 
possible  due  to  intense  competition  they  will  have  to  reduce  employment.
12 As  a  result, 
unemployment increases and workers will turn to the informal sector. The increase in the 
minimum wage also increases the pressure on workers to work as self-employed. The net 
effect of the higher minimum wage on tax revenue is therefore not clear, as the gain in tax 
revenue due to lower undeclared income of some firms must be weighed against the risks of 
evading the higher minimum wage and the decline in  regular jobs.  These considerations 
suggest  that  it  is  better  to  keep  the  average  minimum  wage  relatively  low,  and  perhaps 
differentiate  it  according  to  qualifications  and  regions,  for  example  setting  a  reduced 
minimum wage in less developed regions (see Tonin, 2008).  
 
100.  In a cross-country regression analysis Schneider and Dreher (2006) find that stronger 
minimum  wage  regulation  tends  to  increase  the  shadow  economy.  The  European 
Employment Observatory (European Commission 2007) has also explored the impact of the 
minimum  wage  on  the  prevalence  of  undeclared  work.  Among  the  new  EU  countries, 
experiences differ with respect to the impact of the minimum wage on undeclared work and 
attitudes towards using the minimum wage for combating under-declaration of income also 
differs. The European Employment Observatory finds that that:   
 
  In  Hungary,  it  is  likely  that  the  relatively  high  minimum  wage  contributes  to 
undeclared work. Its increase has discouraged formal employment of lower-skilled 
workers and employment in small firms.
13  
  In Poland, where relatively few workers are on the minimum wage, the impact on 
undeclared work appears to be more limited.  
  In  Latvia,  the  minimum  wage  has  been  increased  with  the  aim  to  reduce  under-
declaration of income but it remains close to the subsistence level and is thought to 
still provide incentives to underdeclare income. There is a discussion among policy 
makers to reduce the minimum wage in order to become more competitive, but it is 
feared that this would  increase under-declaration of earnings. 
                                                 
12 The minimum wage sets a floor to the gross wage, so that the employer contribution cannot be 
shifted back onto workers and has to be borne by firms through higher wage costs. 
13 Kertesi and Köllö (2003) found that the increase in the minimum wage in Hungary increased labor 
costs and reduced employment in small firms and also in poorer regions while large firms were not 
affected.  On the other hand, Tonin (2007) found that the 2001 increase of the minimum wage 
reduced tax evasion by reducing net earnings of workers between the old and the new minimum wage.   43 
  In the Czech Republic, the minimum wage has been increased with the aim to reduce 
under-declaration of wages. This policy appears to have not achieved its objective.  
  In Slovakia, the increase in the minimum wage may have acted as an incentive for 
undeclared work, particularly in small firms and low-wage sectors, although there is 
no clear empirical evidence for such an impact.  
  In  Estonia, Lithuania,  and Slovenia, there  appears to  be no evidence for a major 
impact of the minimum wage on undeclared work; in these countries the minimum 
wage is relatively low and relatively few workers are on the minimum wage. 
  In Bulgaria, minimum wage earners are exempt from social insurance  contributions. 
While this reduces the costs of transition from informal to formal work, it provides 
incentives to underdeclare wages in order to benefit from this exemption. 
  In Romania, the minimum wage is regarded as helpful in reducing under-declaration 
of earnings.  A higher  minimum  wage has  been introduced for  workers  with  high 
educational attainment. This measure is aimed to reduce under-declaration of earnings 
by higher skilled workers.  
 
13.3 Regulatory burden for doing business  
101.  Countries that are reforming their tax systems with the aim to combat undeclared 
work  are  unlikely  to  be  successful  if  at  the  same  time  the  regulatory  burden  and 
administrative  costs  on  business  remain  high  and  the  quality  of  government  institutions 
remains poor. Strict regulations on business activity, such as barriers to entrepreneurship 
including  administrative  burdens  on  start-ups  and  restrictive  labor  codes,  constrain  job 
creation in the formal  sector  and push  firms  and workers into informality. The new EU 
member countries have made much progress in improving conditions for doing business. For 
example, Estonia has reduced administrative burdens with the help of e-services for taxpayers. 
In Slovakia, the procedures for starting new business have been simplified. According to the 
2009 World Bank´s Doing Business report, which covers 10 indicator sets in 181 countries, 
the regulatory environment for business is - among our country group - most favorable in 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. In some of the other countries, notably Croatia, Poland, the 
Czech Repbulic, and Slovenia there are still important barriers for business activity (Table 
14).  
 
Table 14: Ease of Doing Business (rank among 181 countries)  
 
New EU countries and Croatia  Best performers: 
Estonia (22)        Singapore (1) 
Lithuania (28)        New Zealand (2) 
Latvia (29)        United States (3) 
Slovakia (36)  Selected European countries: 
Hungary (41)         Denmark (5) 
Bulgaria (45)         United Kingdom (6) 
Romania (47)         Finland (14) 
Slovenia (54)         Sweden (17) 
Czech Republic (75)         Germany (25)  
Poland (76)          Spain (49) 
Croatia (106)          Greece (96) 
 
 Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2009.   44 
13.4 Effectiveness of government institutions 
102.  The quality of government institutions also matters for fighting undeclared work. If 
institutions remain weak, a tax reform aimed at reducing undeclared work may not achieve its 
objective.
14   According to the corruption perception index of Transparency International, 
among  the  NM-EU  countries,  Slovenia  and  Estonia  have  the  lowest  corruption  while  in 
Bulgaria and Romania corruption is most pervasive (Table 15). This is confirmed by the 
Control of Corruption index of the World Bank, which can also be taken as a proxy for the 
quality of government institutions among the NM-EU countries. According to this indicator, 
Slovenia and Estonia have the strongest and Bulgaria and Romania the weakest government 
intitutions in the region (Table 16).  
 
Table 15: Perception of Corruption  
 
Country  Score  Ranking among  
180 countries 
Slovenia  6.7  26 
Estonia  6.6  27 
Czech Republic  5.2  45 
Hungary  5.1  47 
Latvia  5.0  52 
Slovakia   5.0  52 
Lithuania  4.6  58 
Poland  4.6  58 
Croatia  4.4  62 
Romania  3.8  70 
Bulgaria   3.6  72 
Source: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2009.  
                                                 
14 In  the  literature  there  is  a  controversal  discussion  about  the  relationship  between  institutional  quality, 
corruption and the size of the shadow economy. In theory, the relationship between corruption and the size of 
the shadow economy is ambigous and can be substitutive or complementary, depending on the circumtances 
(see  Dreher  et  al.  2005  and Dreher  and  Schneider  2006 and  the  literature  mentioned  in  these  papers).  If 
corruption (i.e. the use of public power by politicians and civil servants) is used to circumvent overly strict 
regulations (so-called greasing the wheels) it helps firms to survive in the formal sector so that it is a substitute 
to working informally. If instead, corruption allows firms or workers to hide economic activity, government 
officials benefit from the shadow economy and corruption and undeclared work are complementary. Corruption 
in  the  form  of  bribing  tax  collectors  to  keep  economic  activity  fully  or  partially  underground  is  always 
complementary to tax evasion so that reducing this form of corruption helps reducing evasion.   45 
Table 16: Control of Corruption 2008  
(Governance score: from – 2.5 to + 2.5) 
 
New EU countries  Selected other EU countries 
Slovenia (+ 0.95)  Finland (+ 2.34) 
Estonia (+ 0.94)   Denmark (+2.32) 
Hungary (+ 0.55)  New Zealand (+ 2.32) 
Slovakia (+ 0.43)  Sweden (+2.24) 
Poland (+ 0.38)  Germany (+ 1.77) 
Czech Republic (+ 0.37)   United Kingdom (+ 1.77) 
Latvia (+ 0.29)  United States (+ 1.55)  
Lithuania (+ 0.18)  Spain (+ 1.18) 
Croatia (+ 0.12)  Portugal (+ 1.08) 
Romania (- 0.06)  Italy (+ 0.13) 
Bulgaria (- 0.17)   Greece (+ 0.10) 
Source: Governance Matters, Worldwide governance Indicators 1996-2008, The World Bank Group, 2009.  
 
14. Bringing It All Together: Are There Best Practices to Follow?  
 
103.  In the previous sections we have discussed the estimated size of undeclared work in 
the NM-EU countries, its potential causes, and policies to tackle it. We have argued that 
undeclared work may have numerous sources that may interact, in particular a high overall 
tax burden, a high labor tax wedge, notably on low earnings, other features of the tax system 
which provide incentives to under-declare earnings such as unfavorable family taxation, large 
gaps between tax burdens of different income sources (notably between capital income and 
wage income and between dependent employment and self-employment), and ease of tax 
compliance. The divide between formal and informal work is also affected by a number of 
non-tax factors, such as general framework conditions for formal sector activity, the extent of 
corruption, and the skill level of the workforce. Based on the discussion above, Table 17 
provides a higly tentative qualitative rating of these factors for the various countries. It is 
clear that there is a high level of uncertainty with such a rating system as it is only based on 
some hypotheses about the causes of undeclared work and some assessments, which may be 
debatable, rather than on a model-based econometric exercise.  
 
104.  The latter approach would be more meaningful for assessing the effect on the various 
factors on undeclared work, but would require a much larger sample of countries.  Given 
these  caveats,  our  tentative  conclusion  is  that  among  the  NM-EU  countries  Estonia  has 
probably the best conditions for containing undeclared work while in Bulgaria conditions are 
the worst.  Comparing the level  of undeclared  work with  tax and non-tax factors, it also 
appears that the NM-EU countries are in different equilibriums with respect to undeclared 
work and the impact of taxation. This suggests that in some countries tax reductions may 
have little effect if other framework conditions are not improved at the same time. Combating 
undeclared work thus requires a broad approach, which not only strengthens tax enforcement, 
but also makes it easier to comply with the tax system and with other regulations and which 
increases  the  benefits  of  compliance.  This  involves  improving  tax  policies  and  tax 
administration and other framework conditions for regular economic activities and improving 
government institutions more generally. As progress in these areas is uneven among the NM-
EU countries the design of policies needs to consider country-specific conditions:    46 
 
  Among the NM-EU countries, Estonia may be a good example to follow with 
respect to providing relatively easy conditions for paying taxes and has also other 
relatively favorable framework conditions, although there is still room for further 
improvements. 
  Where the quality of institutions (i.e. control of corruption) is particularly low 
(such as in Romania and Bulgaria) isolated tax reforms may have little effect on 
undeclared  work.  Countries  with  low  tax  levels  should  not  continue  lowering 
taxes  (and  could,  perhaps  even  increase  taxes  if  needed)  but  should  focus  on 
improving  institutions,  notably  tax  administration  and  fighting  corruption 
(Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
  In countries with high overall tax levels, reducing the size of the public sector 
would  provide  scope  for  reducing  undeclared  work  by  lowering  labor  taxes 
(notably Hungary and Slovenia). Some of the NM-EU countries have established 
relatively simple tax systems and have also simplified tax collection by unifying 
the  collection  of  general  taxes  and  of  social  security  contributions.  The  other 
countries should follow this practice, as it reduces the costs of paying taxes both 
for  taxpayers  and  the  administration  and  makes  it  easier  to  discover  evasion 
(Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania).  
 
105.  Low-skilled workers who are most vulnerable to informality are in most countries 
faced with relatively high labor tax wedges, which are mainly caused by social insurance 
contributions  while  their  personal  income  tax  burden  is  generally  low  due  to  basic 
exemptions. The high labor tax wedge for low-skilled workers could be reduced by targeted 
measures, such as:  
 
a.  Granting  basic  exemptions  or  reduced  social  insurance  contribution    rates  at  low 
wages; 
b.  Introducing employment tax credits (in-work benefits), which are gradually phased 
out at higher income levels.  
 
104.  Such  targeted  measures  ease  the  transition  into  formal  work  and  also  reduce  the 
incentive to work as self-employed. However, they can also lead to revenue shortfalls, which 
have to be financed by raising other taxes or cutting spending. But care must be taken that the 
higher marginal effective tax rate at higher income levels (due to the increase of the social 
security  rate  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  employment  tax  credit)  does  not  lead  to  work 
disincentives  and/or  under-declaration  of  earnings.  When  making  the  choice  between 
reducing the labor tax burden through lower social security rates or through an employment 
tax credit, it needs to be ensured that labor costs are reduced. For example, in countries where 
gross wages are not flexible due to a binding minimum wage, an employment tax credit does 
increase workers‘ net income and their labor supply but does not increase labor demand as 
labor costs for low-skilled workers are not affected. In these countries, reducing employer 
contributions to social insurance may be a more effective tool to increase labor demand.   
 
105.  The gap between the tax on dividends and the tax on labor encourages individuals to 
evade labor taxes by transforming labor income into capital income. There is some evidence 
that this problem is widespread among the NM-EU countries. This gap could be reduced if by 
lowering  the  labor  tax  wedge  by  making  social  security  contributions  subject  to  income 
ceilings (as is the case in some of the NM-EU countries). This would reduce the marginal 
labor tax wedge for higher income earners so that they have fewer incentives to transform   47 
their wage into capital income. The drawback of this measure is, however, that it makes labor 
taxation regressive, which may be seen as undesirable for equity reasons. The other option is 
to raise the tax on dividend income. The drawback of this option is that it raises capital costs 
for firms that are financing their investment by new share issues, which could constrain the 
creation  of  new  firms  (start  ups),  which  are  most  dependent  on  this  source  of  finance. 
Authorities therefore face the dilemma that narrowing the gap between labor and dividend 
taxation  may  violate  other  objectives.  Countries  could,  perhaps,  follow  the  example  of 
Norway, which implemented in 2006 a reform aimed at reducing the difference between 
taxation of earned income and investment income. Individual shareholders are taxed on their 
dividend income exceeding an amount equal to a risk free interest rate. The combined tax on 
distributed profits at the corporate and the personal level equals 48.16 percent, which is very 
close to the labor tax wedge. 
 
106.  In  all  NM-EU  countries,  the  self-employed  are  receptive  to  evade  taxes  by 
underreporting income and sales. Sometimes employers, notably in the construction sector, 
urge their employees to work as sub-contractors in order to reduce labor cost and to gain 
flexibility in hiring and firing. This reduces tax revenues and also creates precarious jobs 
without adequate social protection. Different measures have been taken by governments to 
address  the  problem  of  bogus  self-employment  and  underreporting  of  income  by  self-
employed: 
 
a.  Establishing minimum labor taxes for self-employed. For example, in Hungary the 
increase  in  the  minimum  social  insurance  contribution  between  1996  and  1999 
reduced the number of self-employed (Scharle, 2002) and in the Czech Republic the 
introduction of a minimum income tax has helped to bring the increase of the number 
of own-account workers to a halt (OECD, 2008). The problem with a minimum labor 
tax is, however, to find the appropriate level. If the level is too low, the measure is 
ineffective in reducing tax evasion but if it is too high, self-employed workers may 
be driven into informality.  
b.   Making the main contractor more responsible for tax compliance of subcontractors. 
For example, in France there is a standard contract for subcontracting, which requires 
that subcontractors abide by the law. In Germany (in the construction sector) and in 
the Netherlands (in the clothing industry) general contractors are liable for the social 
insurance  contributions of the contracted firm, allowing the authorities to claim tax 
and social insurance  debts of subcontractors from contractors.  In the UK, building 
industry  contractors  can  only  pay  their  subcontractors  gross  of  taxes  and 
contributions if they hold a particular certificate from the Inland Revenue.  
c.   Strengthening controls to prevent bogus self-employment, i.e. (mis-) classification of 
(de facto) dependent workers as self-employed. For example, in Germany bogus self-
employment is defined if two of the following four criteria are met: (a) the person 
does not employ another (non-family) worker; (b) the person is regularly working 
only for one employer; (c) the work is similar to that of an employee, i.e. the person 
has  to  follow  the  instructions  of  the  employer  and  is  integrated  into  the  work 
organization of the employer; (d) does not carry out work which is typically done by 
businessmen.  
 
107.  The welfare state in NM-EU countries is mainly financed through labor taxes. This 
leads necessariliy to relatively high labor tax wedges, which encourage undeclared work. 
Labor taxation tends to be mildly progressive at lower and middle-income brackets (due to 
the  basic  allowance  of  personal  income)  and  regressive  at  higher  income  levels  (due  to   48 
income  ceilings  of  social  insurance  contributions).  As  a  result,  most  of  the  burden  of 
redistribution through the state appears to fall on middle-income wage earners while higher 
wage earners and receivers of capital income contribute relatively little, thus violating the 
equity objective.  
 
108.  The tax system could be made both less distorting and more equitable by:  
 
a.  Reducing  labor  taxes,  notably  for  low-skilled  workers  by  financing  part  of  social 
benefits, such as basic pensions and, perhaps, also part of basic healthcare, by general 
taxation, in particular by base-broadening measures. It could also be considered to 
raise property taxation which is extremely low in NM-EU countries and which is 
among the least distorting taxes. 
b.  Linking the non-redistributive part of social security benefits better with contributions, 
for example by transforming defined benefit pension systems in defined contribution 
schemes so that this part of contributions would be perceived less as taxes, which 
would encourage compliance. 
c.  Eliminating regressivity of labor taxation by shifting the burden more towards higher 
income brackets, i.e. making it (mildly) progressive.  
 
109.  Tax administration could be made more effective by making it more independent 
from political interference and provide adequate resources, notably in auditing. Penalties for 
non-compliance should be sufficiently high to raise the potential costs of tax evaders.  Tax 
education should be improved and awareness should be raised, about the benefits of formal 
employment and the costs of underreporting. For example in spring 2006 and again in 2007, 
Latvia  has  launched  the  campaign,  entitled  ―The  employment  contract  works‖,  which 
explains the labor law, the importance of the employment contract and the consequences of 
illegal or undeclared work (Eurofound 2009) and has recently launched new measures based 
on a broad approach (Box 1). In the UK it has been found that campaigns explaining the 
benefits of declared work were more efficient than punitative measures (Willliams, 2008).  
 
Box 1 Recent measures in Latvia to combat the shadow economy 
 
In April 2010, the government of Latvia approved a set of measures to reduce the shadow 
economy.  The  government  emphasized  that  a  broad  approach  is  needed  including 
strengthening tax enforcement but also changing society‘s opinion of the shadow economy 
and encouraging legal business transactions. The main measures are: 
 
-  Reducing cash transactions in wholesale trade from LVL 3 000 (4240 €) to LVL 1000 
(1413  €).  If  cash  transactions  exceed  this  amount  the  taxpayer  must  provide  a 
declaration  on  transactions  with  the  given  partner  in  the  previous  month.  The 
reasoning is that cash transactions are more prone to tax evasion and fraud than bank 
transactions; 
-  Providing  access  to  the  tax  administration  (State  Revenue  Service)  to  the  Loans 
Register at the central bank.  This measure aims at identifying those persons whose 
expenditures exceed income;  
-  Public awareness campaign on how tax revenues are being used, and how paying 
taxes benefit taxpayers. For this purpose the Finance Ministry‘s website will also be 
upgraded; 
-  Encouraging crime reporting to the authorities;   49 
-  Making TIR carnets available to persons who are paid a certain salary in order to 
reduce undeclared salaries in the transit sector;  
-  Establishing a special task force to implement the various measures and also to check 
risk analysis. The task force will also  cooperate with businessmen to identify the 
reasons  for  informal  activities  and  make  specific  proposals  for  reducing  informal 
work in the various sectors.   50 
Table 17: Framework conditions for containing undeclared work 
 


























Size of un- 
declared 
work 
Estonia  +  +/-  +  + +  + +  + +  +  +  + +   (1)     (1) 
Lithuania  +  -  +  +  +  +   +  -  +   (2)     (5) 
Latvia  +  +/-  +  -  +   +  +/-  +   (2)    (8) 
Slovak Republik  +  +  +  -  + +   +/-  +/-  +   (2)    (3) 
Slovenia  -  -    +  -   +/-  +  + +   (5)    (6) 
Hungary  -  -  +  -  - -  +/-  +/-  + +   (6)     (7) 
Croatia  +/-  .    +  +   -  -  +   (6)   . 
Poland  -  -  +  -  - -  -  +/-  + +   (8)    (4) 
Czech Republic  -  +/-  +  - -  - -   -  +/-  + +   (8)    (2) 
Romania  +  -  +  +  + +   +/-  - -  - -   (10)   (10) 
Bulgaria  -   -  +  - -  - - -  +/-  - -  - -   (11)   (11) 
 
Note: Overall tax level: measured by tax revenue as a percent of GDP. Labor tax wedge: measured various indicators such as …. Other tax policies: family 
taxation, in-work benefits, simplified tax regimes etc..Tax administration: measured by the time spent by a typical firm for tax compliance. General efficiency 
of institutions: measured by the Control of Corruption index of the World Bank. Size of informal work: measured by European Employment Observatory EU 
Commission (+ +) means that the size of the informal sector is significantly below, and (+) means just below the average of the country group, (0) means that 
it is around average. (-)  means that it is above and (- -) that it is much average the country average.   51 
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